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  INTRODUCTION   
The 2017 tax legislation1 introduced significant new pref-
erences2 for business income and a new conversation on tax re-
form. The legislation reduced the top corporate rate to 21%3 
and introduced the new Section 199A deduction for qualifying 
business income earned through “pass-throughs.”4 Many com-
mentators criticized the overall distributional effects of these 
changes—which disproportionately benefitted taxpayers with 
the highest incomes—and the flawed design of the pass-
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) [hereinafter The 2017 Tax 
Legislation].  
 2. By “preference” this Article refers to the fact that the 2017 legislation 
generally taxes business income earned by the highest income taxpayers at 
lower rates than it taxes ordinary individual income subject to the top mar-
ginal rates. See infra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
 3. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 13001 (codified at I.R.C § 11 
(2017)). In this Article, unless otherwise specified, the term “corporation” re-
fers to an entity taxed under § 11 and subchapter C of the Internal Revenue 
Code, and the terms “corporate rate” and “corporate system” similarly refer to 
the applicable rules under subchapter C. See also infra notes 48–52 and ac-
companying text (describing the entity classification rules).  
 4. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 11001 (codified at I.R.C. 
§ 199A (2017)). Of course, the 2017 tax legislation also introduced many other 
changes beyond the scope of this Article. See infra note 80. This Article focuses 
in particular on changes in the 2017 tax legislation affecting the taxation of 
business income earned by high income taxpayers, and the different tax reduc-
tion opportunities available in the corporate and pass-through systems. See 
infra Part I.B.  
)  
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through deduction, but tacitly accepted or even praised the cor-
porate rate cut as a response to international pressures.5  
These changes also prompted renewed calls for progressive 
tax reforms, to counteract the regressive effects of the 2017 leg-
islation and to increase the share of the tax burden paid by the 
wealthy. For example, in early 2019, recently elected Repre-
sentative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez proposed a 70% top indi-
vidual income tax rate on the highest-income taxpayers.6 Lead-
ing progressive thinkers defended the proposal, arguing that a 
higher rate in this range would maximize revenues from the 
wealthiest taxpayers7 and address economic inequality.8  
This Article bridges these conversations on the 2017 legis-
lation’s new preferences for business income and the future of 
progressive tax reform and introduces a theoretical framework 
for understanding their interaction. In particular, this Article 
reassesses these conversations in light of what it terms “the 
progressivity ratchet”—a path dependence in the structure of 
the tax system whereby the tax treatment of certain portions of 
the income tax base can determine the degree of progressivity 
across the income tax system, measured in terms of net taxes 
 
 5. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 6. See Veronica Stracqualursi, Ocasio-Cortez Suggests 70% Tax for 
Wealthy To Fund Climate Change Plan, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 4, 2019, 10:57 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/04/politics/Alexandria-ocasio-cortez-tax 
-climate-change-plan/index.html [https://perma.cc/P28U-FTLM]. This change 
would represent a significant increase from the top marginal rate at the time 
of approximately 40%. I.R.C. §§ 1(a)–(d), (j), 1411 (net investment income tax), 
3101(b), 3111(b) (Medicare payroll taxes).  
 7. See Paul Krugman, Opinion, The Economics of Soaking the Rich, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/opinion/alexandria 
-ocasio-cortez-tax-policy-dance.html. As Krugman notes, an approximately 
70% top rate would be consistent with the revenue-maximizing rate calculated 
by some leading economists and the top federal income tax rate in prior dec-
ades. Id.; see also Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progres-
sive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 
165, 171 (2011) (calculating a revenue-maximizing rate of 73% using their pre-
ferred parameters); Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, The Incentive Ef-
fects of Marginal Tax Rates: Evidence from the Interwar Era, 6 AM. ECON. J.: 
ECON. POL’Y 242, 269 (2014) (calculating a revenue-maximizing rate of 74% 
based on responsiveness to tax rates during the inter-war era). 
 8. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Opinion, Alexandria 
Ocasio-Cortez’s Tax Hike Idea Is Not About Soaking the Rich: It’s About Cur-
tailing Inequality and Saving Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/opinion/ocasio-cortez-taxes.html. 
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paid by those at the top relative to others.9 The progressivity 
ratchet suggests a different assessment of the corporate rate 
cut and the new pass-through deduction from how these chang-
es have been typically assessed in the literature to date, and 
explains how these changes will obstruct proposals for future 
progressive tax reform. In particular, this Article argues why 
both the corporate rate reduction and the pass-through deduc-
tion should be understood as core structural failings of the 2017 
legislation which will limit the progressive potential of the in-
come tax system.  
The progressivity ratchet begins with familiar analysis 
from the literature on optimal tax design. One basic principle, 
which this Article terms the “neutrality principle,” provides 
that policymakers should tax close substitutes—goods or activi-
ties where an increase in the price of one induces a shift to the 
other10—similarly to minimize taxpayer avoidance responses 
that will result in revenue loss and efficiency costs.11  
This Article expands on this traditional analysis in the 
public finance literature to explain when the introduction of a 
 
 9. The term “ratchet” refers generally to a device that “engages to pre-
vent reverse motion.” Ratchet, SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (6th 
ed. 2007). In this case, the device would be preferences for business income 
introduced by the 2017 legislation and the reverse motion would be a more 
progressive system that raises more revenue from the wealthiest taxpayers. 
As described infra in Part III.A, the ratchet can also operate in reverse, 
whereby higher taxes on a portion of the base can enable progressive taxation 
on other portions of the tax base. This Article focuses on the progressivity 
ratchet’s role in the federal income tax, although the same analysis could also 
be extended to other tax instruments.  
 10. See HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 330–36 (9th ed. 
2010) (explaining how taxation on one good can induce shifting to another).  
 11. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing 
in the Tax Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 71 (2000) (“[L]ines should be drawn so 
that a transaction or item is taxed like its closest substitutes.”). This principle 
traces back to the classic finding by Frank Ramsey on the optimal tax rates on 
different commodities, which will depend upon the degree to which taxpayers 
substitute between higher and lower taxed commodities. See generally F. P. 
Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927). 
Ramsey concludes in part that “rival” commodities should be taxed “such as to 
leave unaltered the proportions in which they are consumed.” Id. at 59. Among 
other implications, this framework suggests that close substitutes should face 
similar tax rates. Ramsey’s commodity tax analysis can also be applied to ac-
tivities in an income tax facing differential rates. Cf. Weisbach, supra, at 75 
(“Although the motivation behind this paper is the income tax, the structure of 
this problem is similar to the standard optimal commodity tax problem.”). 
)  
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new preference in response to an initial preference either miti-
gates or compounds tax avoidance opportunities generated by 
the initial preference (and thereby the effect of the progressivi-
ty ratchet) and highlights the first-order importance of the le-
gal rules defining the new preference.12 The systemic impact of 
a new preference—such as the new business tax preferences in 
the 2017 legislation—will depend on whether it increases op-
portunities for taxpayers to avoid higher taxes on other por-
tions of the base, and more generally whether it violates the 
neutrality principle. If an initial preference cannot be eliminat-
ed, the neutrality principle suggests that a second tax prefer-
ence may be desirable to the minimize the revenue loss and tax 
avoidance resulting from the initial preference.13 This would be 
the case if the rules defining the new preference effectively tar-
get income that would otherwise shift to the preexisting prefer-
ence and the second preference can instead tax that income at a 
higher rate.14 In that case, adding a second preference (or more) 
may be more desirable than just one, as the second preference 
may have the effect of taxing close substitutes more neutrally 
and preventing substitution toward the lowest taxed category. 
Adding a poorly targeted new preference, in contrast, will com-
pound the effect of the initial preference and increase the effi-
ciency costs and revenue loss resulting from tax avoidance.15  
In the traditional framework, the primary problem with in-
troducing a poorly targeted preference would simply be the in-
creased efficiency costs from raising revenue. While this effect 
may be independently undesirable, this Article describes the 
potentially more significant implications of this analysis for 
policymakers desiring to increase the progressivity of the tax 
system—and thereby to raise more revenue from the wealthiest 
 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. See discussion infra Part II.B.1; cf. Weisbach, supra note 11, at 77 (de-
scribing how, in the presence of one distortionary tax, it can be efficiency en-
hancing to add a second distortionary tax which reduces the distortionary ef-
fects of the first tax).  
 15. This Article’s conceptual framework explaining the proper analysis of 
preferences introduced in response to other preferences can be applied broadly 
when analyzing possible tax reforms. The discussion in this Article focuses on 
applying this framework to evaluate proposals to raise rates on high income 
taxpayers and the business preferences that disproportionately benefited them 
in the 2017 legislation. See infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.  
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taxpayers16—when they face certain political constraints on 
how they can progressively raise additional revenue. This anal-
ysis suggests that the introduction of greater opportunities for 
tax avoidance can generate the progressivity ratchet, which can 
in turn limit policymakers to less progressive outcomes if they 
do not reverse the tax preferences allowing the new avoidance 
opportunities.17  
Specifically, this Article describes how the progressivity 
ratchet can result from the interaction of greater opportunities 
for tax avoidance with one or more of three related background 
constraints policymakers may face in progressively taxing the 
wealthy.18 The first possible constraint arises to the extent pol-
icymakers are concerned with the efficiency costs from taxing 
the wealthy (the “efficiency cost constraint”).19 In that case, pol-
icymakers may determine to collect less tax revenue from the 
wealthy than they would otherwise, if additional revenue en-
tails a higher efficiency cost as the wealthy incur costs to avoid 
the rate increases. A second possible constraint arises when 
policymakers face political obstacles to increasing progressivity 
by simply raising the top statutory rates (the “salience of tax 
rates constraint”).20 In this case, greater opportunities for tax 
avoidance will reduce the revenue collected at the chosen top 
rate. A final possible constraint similarly arises if policymakers 
choose to tax the wealthy at the revenue-maximizing rate (the 
“revenue maximizing rate constraint”).21 In this case as well, 
greater opportunities for tax avoidance will reduce the revenue 
collected at this maximum rate.  
These constraints may be driven by the preferences of con-
stituents, the independent preferences of the policymakers, or 
some combination thereof. Regardless of their source, the con-
straints link legal rules that give greater opportunities for tax 
 
 16. For a discussion of why a more progressive tax system may be desira-
ble, see infra notes 278–82 and accompanying text.  
 17. See infra Part IV.C. 
 18. This Article’s framework does not seek to comprehensively describe all 
the ways greater tax avoidance may affect progressivity, but it is meant to lay 
out plausible conditions under which a violation of the neutrality principle 
that leads to greater tax avoidance will undermine progressivity. 
 19. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 20. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 21. See infra Part III.A.3. 
)  
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planning to the outcome of less revenue in the end being col-
lected from taxpayers at the top of the distribution.  
When policymakers face any of these three constraints, the 
tax treatment of certain portions of the tax base can have sys-
temic consequences for overall progressivity in the tax system. 
The progressivity ratchet can operate in either direction: higher 
taxes on a portion of the tax base can enable greater overall 
progressivity—after taking into account the effects elsewhere 
in the system—whereas new preferences for a portion of the tax 
base can constrain overall progressivity. However, while the 
ratchet can operate in either direction, this Article focuses on 
the case of the 2017 legislation where a new preferences in the 
tax system—the corporate rate reduction or Section 199A—
constrain the progressive potential overall of the tax system, by 
undermining effectiveness of higher taxes on other portions of 
the tax base. 
This framework implies a different assessment of the busi-
ness tax changes in the 2017 tax legislation than is commonly 
found in the literature to date. Proponents of the corporate rate 
cut argued that it was necessary to achieve closer neutrality 
with falling foreign rates and to stop U.S. multinational corpo-
rations (MNCs) from shifting profits and investment to lower 
tax foreign jurisdictions.22 In that case, the initial preference is 
the lower taxes foreign jurisdictions imposed on mobile income, 
and the new preference, introduced in response to this initial 
preference, is the corporate rate cut. Many commentators con-
sequently justified the corporate rate cut as a desirable re-
sponse to pressures on the international tax system.23 
 
 22. For instance, the House Republican leadership justified a large corpo-
rate rate cut as bringing the United States rate more in line with other coun-
tries. See GOP, A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA 24 
(2016) [hereinafter GOP, A BETTER WAY], https://www.novoco.com/sites/ 
default/files/atoms/files/ryan_a_better_way_policy_paper_062416.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/T2RC-WY49] (asserting that the average OECD corporate tax rate 
today is 24.8% while the U.S corporate tax rate remains at 35%); see also DAN-
IEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 168–69 (2009) (describ-
ing competition for reported profits and actual investment as the two justifica-
tions that advocates offered for lowering the corporate tax rate); Nigel Chalk 
et al., The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: An Appraisal 6 (IMF, Working Paper No. 
WP/18/185, 2018) (“[T]he reduction simply restores the U.S. to the relative po-
sition it had in the early 1990s, at around the OECD norm.”).  
 23. For academic commentary justifying the corporate rate cut as a desir-
able response to pressures on the international system, see, for example, Mi-
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This Article’s framework explains, however, why these 
changes to the corporate system violated the neutrality princi-
ple and are likely, if not reversed, to increase the efficiency 
costs from raising additional revenue. The claimed benefits of a 
lower corporate rate—in reducing profit shifting and increasing 
domestic investment24—are likely small relative to the new av-
enues for tax avoidance that the corporate rate cut generated. 
In this respect, the corporate rate reduction may be understood 
as a core structural failing of the 2017 legislation.  
 
chael J. Graetz, Foreword—The 2017 Tax Cuts: How Polarized Politics Pro-
duced Precarious Policy, 128 YALE L.J.F. 315, 320 (2018) (noting the im-
portance of the international competition for profits and concluding that “a 
significantly lower corporate rate has been long overdue, and raising it would 
be a mistake”); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, How Terrible Is the New Tax Law?: Re-
flections on TRA17 5 (Univ. Mich. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 18-002, 
2018) (“On the corporate side, the main change is a long overdue reduction of 
the rate to 21% . . . .”); Chalk et al., supra note 22, at 5 (“Most observers regard 
a cut in the statutory rate of corporation tax as long overdue.”). Other com-
mentators did not necessarily embrace the corporate rate cut, but also did not 
prominently target it for reversal, as they do for other changes in the 2017 leg-
islation. For instance, Jared Bernstein, a leading progressive economic advisor 
and commentator, wrote a list of tax changes that progressives should consid-
er in addition to raising the top individual income tax rate, and it included 
eliminating the pass-through deduction but not raising the corporate rate. 
Jared Bernstein, Building on Ocasio-Cortez: More Progressive Ways To Raise 
Much-Needed Tax Revenues, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/16/building-ocasio-cortez-more 
-progressive-ways-raise-much-needed-tax-revenues/?utm_term= 
.748fbdb27694. Some politicians—although few academics—then justified Sec-
tion 199A as an additional preference necessary to preserve neutrality be-
tween domestic corporate and pass-through income in light of the corporate 
rate cut. See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. S7674 (2017) (statement of Sen. Portman) 
(defending the pass-through deduction as “try[ing] to have some more parity 
between the pass-through companies and the so-called C corporations”); Press 
Release, Ron Johnson, U.S. Senator, Johnson Statement on Current Tax Re-
form Proposals (Nov. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Sen. Johnson Press Release], 
https://www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/11/johnson 
-statement-on-current-tax-reform-proposals [https://perma.cc/G5CN-TRER] 
(“[I]t is important to maintain the domestic competitive position and balance 
between large publicly traded C corporations and ‘pass-through entities.’”); see 
also SCOTT GREENBERG & NICOLE KAEDING, TAX FOUND., REFORMING THE 
PASS-THROUGH DEDUCTION 2 (2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/ 
20180621095652/Tax-Foundation-FF593.pdf [https://perma.cc/BMZ8-HEGS] 
(“Supporters of the deduction argue that it . . . helps put the pass-through sec-
tor on an equal footing with the largest multinational corporations.”). 
 24. See infra Part IV.A. 
)  
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A second strain of commentary—to which we contributed—
criticized the 2017 legislation, and particularly the design of 
Section 199A, for the many new “tax games” that it would in-
vite.25 This Article provides the conceptual framework to un-
derstand why the provision violates the neutrality principle, 
and, thus, likely compounds the progressivity ratchet. The Ar-
ticle also explains how Section 199A is, to a significant degree, 
a symptom of the problem generated by the corporate rate cut, 
rather than a unique flaw in the legislation.26 At the very least, 
the corporate rate reduction and Section 199A both reflect a 
similar mistake: Congress’s failure to properly apply the neu-
trality principle.  
The consequences of these mistargeted preferences are not 
limited to their regressive effects and their incentives to costly 
tax planning—both design flaws that have received attention in 
the literature so far, particularly in the case of Section 199A.27 
More importantly, these changes are likely to constrain future 
progressive reforms unless they are reversed.28 This path de-
 
 25. See, e.g., David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, 
Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 
1439 (2019) (detailing a range of tax planning maneuvers possible under the 
new law including Section 199A); Daniel Shaviro, Evaluating the New U.S. 
Pass-Through Rules, 218 BRITISH TAX REV. 49, 51 (2018) (“The pass-through 
rules stand front and centre in illustrating both the 2017 Act’s sloppiness and 
its lack of principle.”). 
 26. See infra Part IV.B. 
 27. See infra Part I.C.1.  
 28. Early reactions to Representative Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal to raise the 
top individual rate have generally underappreciated how the changes to the 
business tax system in the 2017 legislation would obstruct this reform. See in-
fra notes 283–86 and accompanying text. The Penn Wharton Budget Model 
estimates that 35% of ordinary income earned by those with adjusted gross 
income above $500,000 came from pass-throughs before the 2017 legislation. 
E-mail from John A. Ricco, Senior Analyst, Penn Wharton Budget Model, to 
David Kamin, Professor of Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law (Feb. 13, 2019, 1:14 
PM EST) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Feb. 13 Ricco E-mail]. If Congress 
raises the individual rates but preserves the low corporate rate, much of this 
individual income could shift to the corporate tax system. See infra Part IV.C. 
Commentators have warned of the general threat that a corporate rate cut 
could present to progressive taxation. For instance, Professor Daniel Shaviro 
has cautioned that lowering the corporate rate could undermine the progres-
sivity of the individual income tax as taxpayers shift their income—and par-
ticularly their labor income—from the individual to the corporate system. See 
SHAVIRO, supra note 22, at xii–xiii (“[A] large gap between corporate and indi-
vidual rates is a potential tax-planning bonanza for taxpayers who can shift 
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pendency in the tax system—potentially setting the country on 
a course toward a less progressive fiscal system over the long-
term—could be the more lasting legacy of the 2017 legislation 
and these business tax preferences. This Article concludes by 
considering some of the possible avenues for policymakers to 
“reverse the ratchet” and enable future progressive reforms. 
One direction is to simply revert to the prior relationship be-
tween the individual and corporate systems, which generally 
penalized the corporate form and reserved the corporate system 
for companies requiring access to public equity markets.29 This 
approach, while it has received little support so far in the liter-
ature, is likely to be more desirable, and less costly, than the 
tax structure resulting from the 2017 legislation.30 This Arti-
cle’s framework also contextualizes a range of alternative re-
forms proposed in the prior literature that could break the 
ratchet by improving the targeting of new preferences or by 
eliminating initial preferences in the tax system, and suggests 
how policymakers can weigh these alternatives.31 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I 
begins by describing key features of the business tax system be-
fore 2017, the key changes in the 2017 legislation, and some of 
the most salient assessments of these changes in the literature 
to date. Part II then builds upon the basic neutrality principle 
to explain when introduction of a new preference does or does 
not increase the efficiency of raising additional revenue, with a 
particular focus on how well the legal rules defining the new 
preference target those eligible for the initial preference. Part 
III extends this analysis and introduces the idea of the “pro-
 
their income into a corporate entity and avoid the second layer of tax. It also 
raises serious questions about fitting a lower corporate rate into an overall 
system that may still be intended to distribute tax burdens progressively.”); 
see also infra note 143 (summarizing various opinions on corporate tax policy). 
This Article builds on this prior work by first contextualizing the trade-offs 
from a corporate rate cut within this Article’s neutrality framework focused on 
the legal rules defining tax preferences, and then explaining why both the cor-
porate rate cut and Section 199A are misguided attempts to pursue neutrality 
in the tax system in light of this framework. 
 29. See infra Part IV.D.1.  
 30. As described infra notes 309–11 and accompanying text, this approach 
could still address international pressures in other ways, such as through ex-
panded base protection measures reducing the ability of corporations to sub-
stitute across that margin.  
 31. See infra Part III.B.3. 
)  
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gressivity ratchet,” explaining how a poorly targeted new pref-
erence can, under several plausible conditions, lead to policy-
makers to choose less progressivity overall. Part IV then reas-
sesses the 2017 legislation in light of this framework and 
explains how its mistargeted business tax preferences, includ-
ing the corporate rate cut, will obstruct future progressive tax 
reform. Part IV then considers possible options to “reverse the 
ratchet” and how to evaluate them.  
I.  BUSINESS TAXATION AND THE 2017 TAX 
LEGISLATION   
This Part describes the state of the tax system under prior 
law, and then reviews the motivations behind the business tax 
preferences in the 2017 legislation, the key features of these 
changes, and prevalent early assessments of these changes in 
the literature to date.  
A. THE CORPORATE AND PASS-THROUGH SYSTEMS UNDER 
PRIOR LAW  
The federal income tax offers two systems for taxing busi-
ness income: through either a corporation or a pass-through. 
Scholars have long debated the desirability of using two sys-
tems rather than one and the wisdom of a separate corporate 
tax.32 Perhaps the strongest justification for the entity-level 
corporate tax is the administrative convenience from taxing 
large, publicly-traded companies with frequent changes in 
ownership at the entity level, rather than attempting to attrib-
ute the entity’s profits to the individual owners each year. By 
contrast, smaller privately-held businesses might not require 
entity-level taxation and can be taxed more easily as pass-
throughs at the level of the individual owners.33 The discussion 
 
 32. For a general summary of the primary justifications for—and prob-
lems with—a separate corporate tax, see SHAVIRO, supra note 22, at 3–42.  
 33. See id. at 13 (“By using the entity as a collection vehicle, one central-
izes administration of the tax and needs only a single reporting taxpayer.”); 
David A. Weisbach, New Equity Integration, 71 TAX L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2017) 
(“By taxing the income at the shareholder level, a shareholder allocation sys-
tem ensures that the income is taxed much the same as it would be if it were 
earned outside of the corporation. Notwithstanding the accuracy it would pro-
vide, shareholder allocation systems are widely viewed as unadministrable in 
the publicly-held corporation context and have never been seriously pro-
posed.”). 
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that follows reviews the basic rates and rules governing these 
two systems before the 2017 legislation. 
1. General Rules 
Single Versus Double Taxation. Under “pass-through” tax-
ation, the profits and losses of the business pass through to the 
owners’ individual tax returns, with no separate entity-level 
tax.34 In this system, the owners’ tax consequences depend 
principally on when the business realizes taxable income and 
how the business agreement allocates that income.35 The dis-
tribution of profits from the pass-through or the sale of owner-
ship interests in the pass-through do not generally trigger addi-
tional tax, since the income would already have been taxed at 
the individual level when earned.36 
The corporate income tax system, in contrast, taxes certain 
forms of business income twice: first at the entity level37 and 
then at the individual level when the taxpayer receives distri-
butions from the corporation or sells the corporate stock.38 The 
double layer of tax applies only to income accruing to equity 
shareholders. The corporation can deduct interest payments to 
 
 34. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(2), 63 (2017) (stating that income from a sole pro-
prietorship is taxed as part of an individual’s gross income); id. § 701 (stating 
that income from a tax partnership is similarly included on the partner’s indi-
vidual income tax return); id. §§ 1361–1399 (stating that income from corpora-
tions that elect to be treated as S corporations similarly passes through to the 
shareholder’s individual return).  
 35. For instance, a partner’s income from a partnership is based on the 
partner’s distributive share of the partnerships gains and losses. See id. 
§ 702(a)–(c). 
 36. See id. §§ 731(a) (governing distributions), 741 (governing gain upon 
sale of a partnership interest). Distribution of money from the partnership can 
trigger gain to the distributee, but only when the money distributed exceeds 
the basis that the partner has in her partnership interest. Id. § 731(a). The 
partner’s basis in the partnership interest is adjusted upward as the partner-
ship recognizes income taxed at the partner level. Id. § 705. As a result, distri-
butions of earnings generally do not result in additional taxable income to the 
distribute, and the partner generally does not recognize further gain or loss 
upon sale of a partnership interest unless there are underlying unrealized 
gain or loss upon the sale of a partnership interest unless there are underlying 
unrealized gains or losses on property in the partnership.  
 37. Id. § 11.  
 38. See id. § 61(a)(7) (taxation of dividends), § 61(a)(3) (taxation of capital 
gains). Corporations cannot deduct these amounts, which results in the “dou-
ble tax” on corporate income.  
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debt-holders39 and employee compensation40 up to certain lim-
its41 from its base of income subject to the entity-level tax. As a 
result, these payments from a corporation are only taxed once 
at the individual level.42 
Relative Tax Rates. In the period immediately preceding 
the 2017 tax legislation, the tax rules generally taxed income 
earned through a pass-through more lightly than income 
earned through a corporation. Before the 2017 tax legislation, 
the Code taxed corporate income at a top average rate of 35%.43 
If the corporation then immediately distributed the profits to 
the shareholder (or if the shareholder sold their stock), the 
shareholder would face an additional individual level tax of up 
to 23.8%.44 The combined effective tax rate from these two lay-
ers of tax would have been approximately 50% for an owner fac-
ing the top rates.45 As described below, however, a taxpayer 
may be able to reduce or eliminate the second individual layer 
of tax on income earned through a corporation.46 In the extreme 
case, only the first layer of tax—which reached 35% before 
2017—would then apply. 
In contrast, the Code only taxes income earned through the 
pass-through at the individual level. Prior to the 2017 tax legis-
 
 39. Id. § 163(a).  
 40. Id. § 162(a)(1).  
 41. The 2017 tax legislation capped the amount of deductible interest 
payments at an amount equal to the sum of the corporation’s business interest 
income, 30% of adjusted taxable income, and floor plan financing interest. The 
2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 13301(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 163(j) 
(2017)). The Code also limits the amount of deductible compensation paid to 
certain corporate executives. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2017).  
 42. See id. § 61(a)(4) (taxation of interest), § 61(a)(1) (taxation of employee 
compensation). 
 43. I.R.C. § 11(b) (2012). Prior law taxed corporate income under four gen-
eral brackets, reaching 35%, plus two “bubble brackets” on income in certain 
ranges, so that corporations with taxable income in excess of approximately 
$18.33 million would pay an average rate of 35% on the entire taxable income 
base. Id. Prior law also taxed income earned by a “personal service corpora-
tion” separately at an ungraduated 35% rate, irrespective of the amount 
earned. Id. § 11(b)(2). 
 44. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (2012) set the maximum rate imposed on capital gains 
at 20%. I.R.C. § 1411 (2012) added an additional 3.8% Medicare Contribution 
tax for high income individuals, leading to a maximum tax rate of 23.8% on 
capital gains. 
 45. 100% - (100% - 35%) x (100% - 23.8%) = 50.47%.  
 46. See discussion infra Part I.A.2. 
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lation, the Code taxed ordinary income earned by an individual 
through a pass-through at a top rate of approximately 
43.4%47—a rate significantly lower than the combined effective 
rate on corporate income subject to both layers of tax at the top 
rates. In order for the two systems to produce roughly equiva-
lent tax rates on ordinary income, a corporate shareholder 
would have to avoid almost all of the individual layer of tax on 
corporate income.  
Entity Classification Rules. The “check the box” regulations 
generally allow closely-held businesses to choose between the 
corporate and pass-through systems.48 Eligible entities include 
partnerships, LLCs, and certain other business forms orga-
nized under state law, as well as businesses not organized at 
all under state law.49 Businesses organized as corporations un-
der state law, which are ineligible for this election, can still 
elect pass-through treatment as an “S corporation” if the entity 
is not publicly traded and meets certain other requirements.50 
Publicly-traded companies, however, are treated as taxable 
corporations regardless of their status under state law,51 and 
generally cannot elect S corporation treatment.52  
The combination of a tax penalty on corporations relative 
to pass-throughs and these choice-of-entity rules led many 
closely-held companies to operate as pass-throughs before the 
 
 47. The maximum statutory tax rate at the time under the individual in-
come tax was 39.6%. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(e) (2012). Additional taxes on different 
forms of income increased the effective top rate by up to approximately 3.8%. 
See, e.g., id. § 3101(b) (Medicare payroll tax and surtax), § 3111(b) (same), 
§ 1401(b) (self-employment taxes), § 1411 (net investment income tax). 
 48. Eligible entities with two or more owners can elect to be classified ei-
ther as a partnership (and be treated under subchapter K), or as an associa-
tion (and be treated as a corporation for tax purposes). Treas. Reg.  
§ 301.7701-3(a) (2019). Eligible entities with just a single owner can elect to be 
classified as an association (and be treated as a corporation for tax purposes) 
or “to be disregarded as an entity separate from its owner.” Id. 
 49. Id. § 301.7701-2(b) (2019). 
 50. I.R.C. § 1361(b) (2012). 
 51. Publicly-traded partnerships are generally treated as corporations 
under I.R.C. § 7704 (2012). There are limited exceptions when a partnership 
primarily engages in investing activities. Id. § 7704(c). 
 52. Corporations cannot elect S corporation treatment if, among other re-
strictions, they have more than 100 shareholders or have any shareholders 
who are not individuals, which disqualifies most publicly-traded companies. 
Id. § 1361(b)(1).  
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2017 legislation, and largely reserved the corporate income tax 
system for publicly-traded companies.53  
2. Corporate Tax Reduction Opportunities and Anti-Abuse 
Rules  
Taxpayers may be able to use the corporate system to re-
duce their effective tax rate through a variety of strategies. Pri-
or to the 2017 legislation, however, the relatively high corpo-
rate rate limited the potential benefit many taxpayers could 
gain by earning income through a corporation and then using 
these strategies, instead of earning the income through a pass-
through.  
The corporate system allows taxpayers to defer the second 
individual layer of tax until they receive a distribution from the 
corporation or dispose of their interest.54 Taxpayers can take 
advantage of this deferral opportunity to reduce or eliminate 
the second individual layer of tax.55 The taxpayer can defer the 
individual layer of tax entirely, for example, by holding the 
stock through their life and then benefitting from the “step-up” 
in basis at death, which entirely eliminates the second layer of 
 
 53. See, e.g., George A. Plesko, “Gimme Shelter?” Closely Held Corpora-
tions Since Tax Reform, 48 NAT’L TAX J. 409, 415 (1995) (“Trends in the corpo-
rate sector, coupled with proposed policy changes at the federal level, suggest 
a diminished role for the corporate tax among all but the largest companies.”); 
George A. Plesko & Eric J. Toder, Changes in the Organization of Business Ac-
tivity and Implications for Tax Reform, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 855, 868 (2013) (“In 
contrast to the demographics of the business environment in 1986, far more 
businesses (in both total and percentages) are organized as pass-through enti-
ties, and they account for a far larger percentage of economic activity.”); Bret 
Wells, Pass-Through Entity Taxation: A Tempest in the Tax Reform Teapot, 14 
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 17 (2014) (“[A]lthough Congress blocked the exit for 
most publicly-traded companies through the adoption of Section 7704, it left in 
place the means of side-stepping the corporate tax regime for non-publicly 
traded companies by leaving the choice of entity decision with taxpayers, and 
taxpayers have systematically chosen to conduct their business in pass-
through entity structures in the post-1986 era.”). 
 54. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
 55. Income earned through a pass-through, in contrast, flows through to 
the owner’s individual income tax return in the year it is earned. Distributions 
from the business do not, in general, trigger additional taxes because the in-
come was fully taxed as it was earned. As a result, taxpayers generally do not 
have a similar incentive to defer the receipt of income earned through a pass-
through. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. But see Ari Glogower, Re-
quiring Reasonable Comp From a Corp, 160 TAX NOTES 961 (2018) (describing 
potential benefits from retaining earnings from an S corporation).  
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tax.56 Similarly, a taxpayer could reduce or eliminate the sec-
ond layer of tax by waiting until she is in a lower bracket before 
taking a distribution or by taking advantage of other provisions 
such as the exclusion of gains on the sale of certain small busi-
ness stock.57 Finally, deferring the second layer of tax can re-
duce the effective tax liability if the corporation invests re-
tained earnings in assets which would generate ordinary 
income to an individual investor, such as taxable interest-
bearing bonds.58 
In some circumstances, deferring the second layer of corpo-
rate tax does not reduce the effective liability. A taxpayer 
would not benefit from deferring the distribution of corporate 
earnings when the second individual layer of the corporate 
double tax is ultimately paid and income from reinvested earn-
ings is subject to approximately the same tax rate within the 
corporation as it would be outside the corporation.59 This would 
be the case for investments eligible for the long-term capital 
gains rate.60 In other circumstances, however, retaining earn-
ings within a corporation could allow the taxpayer to achieve 
substantial tax savings.61 
Before the 2017 tax legislation, however, the top individual 
rate of approximately 43.4% did not significantly exceed the top 
corporate rate of 35%.62 As a result, even if a taxpayer could en-
tirely eliminate the second individual-layer of tax on corporate 
earnings, the corporate system did not offer a significant tax 
reduction opportunity relative to the pass-through system.63 
 
 56. I.R.C. § 1014 (2012); see, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax? 
Revisited, 93 NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. 268, 271 (2000) (describing how a taxpay-
er can avoid the individual income tax through a “buy, borrow, die” strategy). 
 57. I.R.C. § 1202 (2012). For a more detailed description of these strate-
gies, see Kamin et al., supra note 25, at 1449. 
 58. See Kamin et al., supra note 25, at 1451–52. 
 59. See Ari Glogower & David Kamin, Sheltering Income Through a Cor-
poration, 164 TAX NOTES FED. 507, 515 (2019). 
 60. Id. at 508. 
 61. Id. (describing the potential benefits from earning income through a 
corporation if the retained earnings generate ordinary income or if the taxpay-
er can reduce or eliminate the second individual layer of the corporate double 
tax).  
 62. See supra notes 43, 47 and accompanying text.  
 63. The graduated corporate rates under prior law offered another poten-
tial advantage of using the corporate income tax system for a taxpayers who 
would otherwise have had income taxed at the top individual income tax rate. 
)  
2020] PROGRESSIVITY RATCHET 1515 
 
These strategies offer greater benefits when the top individual 
rate significantly exceeds the corporate rate, which was the 
case in the years before the 1980s64 and, as described below, is 
the case again after the changes in the 2017 tax legislation.65 
To benefit from deferring the individual layer of tax on 
corporate income, however, a taxpayer would also have to avoid 
anti-abuse regimes for undistributed corporate earnings. Under 
the personal holding company rules, a closely-held corporation 
faces a 20% surtax on undistributed income from certain 
sources.66 The rules apply to a company with five or fewer tax-
payers holding a majority share and that earns “personal hold-
ing company income.”67 The accumulated earnings tax rules al-
so impose a 20% surtax on any corporation’s retained earnings 
beyond “the reasonable needs of the business.”68 
The effect of these anti-abuse rules will vary considerably 
based on taxpayers’ individual circumstances and their ability 
to engage in sophisticated tax planning. A worker earning labor 
income, for instance, cannot easily form a corporation, direct 
her previous salary to that corporation, and retain her earnings 
in that corporation to defer the second individual layer of tax. 
This simple strategy would likely run afoul of both anti-abuse 
rules.69 In other cases, more sophisticated taxpayers can skirt 
 
In that case, a taxpayer could have benefitted from the lower marginal rates 
on corporate income if the corporation did not fall into the highest bracket. 
This opportunity was limited for service-oriented businesses by the flat 35% 
rate on income from personal service corporations. See supra note 43.  
 64. Compare Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates, URBAN-
BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
statistics/historical-highest-marginal-income-tax-rates [https://perma.cc/VS5D 
-B9GD], with Corporate Top Tax Rate and Bracket, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX 
POL’Y CTR. (July 17, 2019) [hereinafter Corporate Rates, URBAN-BROOKINGS], 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/corporate-top-tax-rate-and-bracket 
[https://perma.cc/D4MN-95BJ].  
 65. See infra Part I.B. 
 66. I.R.C. § 541 (2012). 
 67. Id. § 542(a). “Personal holding company income” includes income from 
passive investments (such as dividends or royalties) as well as “personal ser-
vice contracts,” which are service contracts designating a particular person to 
provide the services. Id. § 543. At least 60% of the company’s adjusted gross 
income must be from personal holding income in order for it be labeled as a 
personal holding company. Id. § 542(a)(1). 
 68. Id. §§ 531–537. 
 69. The corporation would be a personal holding company subject to the 
surtax on retained earnings since it would have only one owner and only in-
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these rules with more complex operations. For instance, firms 
can avoid the personal holding company rules by adding addi-
tional shareholders and the accumulated earnings tax by mak-
ing business investments to justify retained earnings.70 For 
these reasons, tax advisors and scholars have described the 
rules as “notoriously ineffective”71 and easily avoidable by so-
phisticated taxpayers.72  
MNCs could also use the corporate system to shift profits 
to lower-tax foreign jurisdictions. A U.S. MNC could then avoid 
any U.S. tax as long as it did not repatriate these profits from 
foreign subsidiaries,73 while a foreign MNC would face no fur-
ther U.S. liability if it shifts the profits out of its U.S. corporate 
subsidiary to a foreign parent or another foreign subsidiary. A 
series of rules sought to prevent these strategies by including 
tests for determining if the U.S. corporation transacted with 
the related foreign corporation as if it were an unrelated third 
party,74 but many considered these rules insufficient, particu-
 
come attributable to a “personal service contract.” See supra notes 67–68. The 
corporation might also be subject to the accumulated earnings tax, since it has 
no business reason to retain the earnings. In this case only the personal hold-
ing company surtax would apply. See I.R.C. § 532(b)(1) (2012) (excepting per-
sonal holding companies from the accumulated earnings tax). 
 70. See I.R.C. § 542(a)(2) (2012) (stock ownership requirement allowing 
more widely held corporations to avoid application of the personal holding 
company tax); id. §§ 533(a), 533(c) (exemption from the accumulated earnings 
tax for earnings retained for the “reasonable needs of the business”).  
 71. Michael L. Schler, Reflections on the Pending Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 
157 TAX NOTES 1731, 1733 (2017).  
 72. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Corporate Capital and Labor Stuffing in the 
New Tax Rate Environment 50–56 (Univ. S. Cal., Legal Studies Research Pa-
per Series No. 13-5, Mar. 21, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2239360 (describing the limitations of these anti-abuse rules). 
 73. For a summary of the basic rules that taxed U.S. corporations on for-
eign income only when subsidiaries repatriated the funds (often called a “de-
ferral” system), see DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXA-
TION 54–57 (2014). As Shaviro notes, this regime was rooted in the long-
standing doctrine that U.S. individuals and corporations are only taxed when 
income is “realized” unless a statutory provision overrides this rule. Id. at 55.  
 74. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b) (2019) (allowing 
the IRS to reallocate income and deductions among related parties in order to 
prevent tax evasion and to more accurately reflect the economic income of the 
parties).  
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larly for mobile and hard-to-value services and property such 
as intellectual property.75  
The pass-through system also offered unique tax reduction 
opportunities prior to the 2017 tax legislation. The pass-
through system gave taxpayers access to the preferential capi-
tal gains rate on sales of property, which does not apply to cor-
porate income.76 Taxpayers could also use pass-throughs to 
shift income through a variety of strategies.77 Prior to the in-
troduction of Section 199A, however, the pass-through system’s 
integration with the individual income tax system tended to 
limit the scope of legal tax planning.78 Most critically, the pass-
through system did not provide taxpayers the same opportunity 
to defer or eliminate the individual tax by retaining earnings in 
the firm.79  
 
 75. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 73, at 77 (describing the failure of 
“transfer pricing” rules governing transactions between U.S. corporations and 
related foreign parties); Richard L. Kaplan, International Tax Enforcement 
and the Special Challenge of Transfer Pricing, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 299 (1990); 
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 734–38 (2011) 
(“Transfer pricing strategies are particularly effective because of the central 
role of high-value unique intangible assets as profit drivers for multinational 
firms.”). For further discussion of the magnitude of profit shifting under prior 
law, see infra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 76. Compare I.R.C. § 1(h) (2012) (providing preferential tax rates for long-
term capital gains for individuals), with id. § 11 (applying the corporate tax 
rate to all taxable income of the corporation irrespective of whether it is a cap-
ital gain). For this reason, taxpayers had little incentive to earn qualifying 
capital gains or dividends through a corporation.  
 77. For instance, members of a pass-through can try to allocate income or 
loss to the partner in the best tax position to absorb it because of their appli-
cable tax rate or other losses or deductions, even as the economics of the deal 
might diverge from these tax allocations. See LAURA E. CUNNINGHAM & NOEL 
B. CUNNINGHAM, THE LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K: A CONCEPTUAL GUIDE TO THE 
TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS 58 (5th ed. 2017) (describing how partners might 
try to specially allocate certain items of income or loss for purposes solely of 
reducing income tax liabilities). There are rules to try to stop these maneu-
vers. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(b) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(a)(2) (2019) (requir-
ing that allocations have “substantial economic effect”). These strategies will 
also generally only allow for the deferral—rather than the elimination—of 
taxes, as the tax treatment of the partners will generally catch up with their 
economic entitlements.  
 78. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 79. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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B. THE CHANGES IN THE 2017 TAX LEGISLATION 
The 2017 law introduced significant preferences for busi-
ness income earned through both corporations and pass-
throughs.80  
The Corporate Rate Reduction. The 2017 tax legislation re-
duced the tax on corporate income to a flat 21% rate.81 This 
dramatic reduction marked a new era for the corporate tax and 
its role in the tax system. The change nearly halved the previ-
ous top rate of 35%82 and resulted in the lowest top rate on cor-
porate income in nearly 80 years.83 At the time of passage, the 
change was projected to reduce corporate tax revenues by more 
than $1.3 trillion84 over the following decade and to accelerate 
the trend of the declining share of federal tax revenues result-
ing from the corporate income tax.85  
The 2017 legislation did not otherwise change the rules 
governing access to the corporate system, however, nor the an-
ti-abuse rules preventing taxpayers from avoiding the second 
individual layer of tax by retaining corporate earnings. In fact, 
the law removed a rate penalty that had applied to certain 
kinds of service-oriented companies, which could not benefit 
 
 80. Of course, the 2017 tax legislation also changed many other tax rules 
affecting taxpayers and businesses. This Article focuses on particular changes 
to the taxation of both domestic and foreign income affecting taxpayers at the 
top of the income distribution.  
 81. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 13001 (codified at I.R.C § 11 
(2017)). 
 82. I.R.C. § 11(b)(1) (2017). The progressive rate schedule and surtaxes for 
income in certain brackets resulted in an average rate of 35% for corporations 
with taxable income above $18.33 million. See supra note 43. 
 83. Corporate income over $25,000 was taxed a top rate of 19% in 1939, 
before wartime revenue measures significantly increased rates beginning in 
the 1940s. The top rate reached as high as about 53% in the late 1960’s before 
falling to the mid-30% range in the late 1980s. Corporate Rates, URBAN-
BROOKINGS, supra note 64.  
 84. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 115th CONG., JCX-3-17, ESTIMATED BUDGET 
EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND 
JOBS ACT,” at 3 (2017), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func= 
startdown&id=5053 [https://perma.cc/8X4A-RG2R]. 
 85. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 115th CONG., JCX-3-18, OVERVIEW OF THE 
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from the previous graduated structure, thus making corporate 
status more attractive for a broader range of taxpayers.86 
Section 199A. The 2017 tax legislation also introduced the 
new Section 199A, allowing a 20% deduction for certain forms 
of business income earned through pass-throughs.87 The rules 
determining eligibility for the new Section 199A deduction are 
complex. Taxpayers with taxable income below a $157,500 
threshold (doubled for joint filers) can generally claim the full 
deduction against their qualifying income from a trade or busi-
ness.88 For these purposes, qualifying income excludes certain 
forms of investment income (such as capital gains and losses, 
dividends and interests),89 compensation earned as an employ-
ee,90 and certain compensation-like payments made to an own-
er of an S corporation or a partnership.91 For taxpayers with 
taxable income above the threshold, the amount of the deduc-
tion is further limited to either 50% of wages paid, or 25% of 
wages and 2.5% of the cost of invested property.92 Finally, tax-
payers in certain sectors of the economy with income above the 
threshold are denied the deduction altogether. These 
“[s]pecified services” include law, healthcare, finance, or “any 
trade or business where the principal asset . . . is the reputa-
tion or skill of 1 or more of its employees.”93  
The Section 199A deduction significantly reduced tax lia-
bilities for affected businesses. For taxpayers in the top income 
tax bracket of 37%, the deduction effectively reduced this top 
rate by more than 7% to approximately 30% (before accounting 
 
 86. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 13001 (codified at I.R.C. § 11 
(2017)) (imposing a flat 21% rate on all corporations and eliminating the sepa-
rate flat 35% rate applying to personal service corporations); see supra notes 
43 and 63 (discussing the rules applying to personal service corporations). 
 87. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 11001 (codified at I.R.C. 
§ 199A (2017)). Section 199A is effective for eight years, from 2018 to 2025. 
I.R.C. § 199A(i) (2017).  
 88. I.R.C. § 199A(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2017). The restrictions imposed above the 
threshold phase-in over a $50,000 range above the threshold (doubled for mar-
ried couples). Id. 
 89. Id. § 199A(c)(3)(B). 
 90. Id. § 199A(d)(1)(B). Technically, this restriction does not affect the def-
inition of “qualified business income” but rather the definition of a “qualified 
trade or business.” Id. 
 91. Id. § 199A(c)(4).  
 92. Id. § 199A(b)(2)(B).  
 93. Id. §§ 199A(d)(1), 1202(e)(3)(A). 
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for other surtaxes).94 The Joint Committee on Taxation esti-
mated that this unprecedented preference for pass-through 
business income in the federal income tax would cost about $50 
billion per year while it is in effect.95  
Changes to the Treatment of Foreign Income. The 2017 leg-
islation also specifically addressed the tax rates applying to 
foreign income earned by both U.S. and foreign MNCs. First, in 
certain circumstances, the reform shifted the United States 
closer to a “territorial” tax system by no longer subjecting re-
patriated foreign earnings of U.S. MNCs to U.S. tax.96 To pre-
vent MNCs from taking advantage of this change to avoid U.S. 
taxes on income from mobile assets, the bill also included both 
an incentive and a penalty to encourage taxpayers to report in-
come from these assets in the U.S. The new “foreign derived in-
tangible income” (FDII) rules provide a deduction for income 
from domestic intangibles earned overseas,97 while the “global 
intangible low-taxed income” (GILTI) taxes U.S. corporations 
(at a reduced rate) on a portion of global income from intangi-
bles located abroad, regardless of whether such income is re-
patriated.98 Finally, the bill introduced the Base Erosion and 
Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT), which penalized certain payments 
 
 94. 20% of the 37% rate equals 7.4%.  
 95. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 85, at 1.  
 96. Specifically, the law introduced a “participation exemption” for divi-
dends received by a U.S. parent company from foreign subsidiaries. The 2017 
Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 14101 (codified at I.R.C. § 245A (2017)). In 
transition, it also imposed a one-time deemed repatriation tax on deferred for-
eign income. Id. § 14103 (codified at I.R.C. § 965 (2017)). A “territorial” tax 
system is one in which a country taxes only the profits of corporations 
“sourced” to that country. A “worldwide” system by contrast taxes the world-
wide profits of corporations resident in the country. SHAVIRO, supra note 73, at 
1. The pre-2017 system was hybrid of both, as it taxed profits of U.S. corpora-
tions on a worldwide basis but often only taxed foreign profits only when re-
patriated. The post-2017 system is also a hybrid, but it has a different package 
of rules, since it still taxes some foreign profits of U.S. MNCs (with no deferral 
option) through the new minimum tax discussed infra note 98. See Susan C. 
Morse, International Cooperation and the 2017 Act, 128 YALE L.J.F. 362, 368 
(2018) (describing how the system continues to be a hybrid of worldwide and 
territorial taxation).  
 97. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 14102 (codified at I.R.C. 
§ 250 (2017)). 
 98. Id. § 14101 (codified at I.R.C. § 951A (2017)). 
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from companies to related foreign parties99 with the aim of re-
ducing profit shifting by both U.S. and foreign-based MNCs. 
Other Changes to Top Rates. In contrast to the transforma-
tive changes to the taxation of corporations and pass-through 
business income, the 2017 tax legislation did not significantly 
change other top tax rates. The legislation slightly reduced the 
top marginal rate on ordinary income from 39.6% to 37%.100 
Rates in this range have been the general norm for the past 
quarter century.101 The 2017 tax legislation also preserved the 
prior top rates of tax on long-term capital gains and qualified 
dividends, which remained at 23.8%.102  
Relative Tax Rates. As a result of the changes in the 2017 
tax legislation (and including surtaxes), ordinary individual in-
come is taxed at a top rate of 40.8%103 while qualifying pass-
through income is taxed at a top rate of 33.4%.104 Corporate in-
come is subject to top rates ranging from 21%—if a taxpayer 
can avoid the individual layer of tax on this income—to 
39.8%105 if the corporate income is immediately distributed and 
subject to the second individual layer of tax. 
C. ASSESSMENTS IN THE LITERATURE  
These changes in the 2017 tax legislation received conflict-
ing receptions among many commentators. The design of Sec-
tion 199A garnered widespread critique, including from some 
supporters of the bill’s other changes.106 The corporate rate re-
duction, in contrast, received tacit acceptance or even approba-
tion from many corners as necessary to address global pres-
sures from lower taxes on mobile income in foreign 
 
 99. Id. § 14401 (codified at I.R.C. § 59A (2017)). 
 100. Compare id. § 11001(a) (codified at I.R.C. § 1(j)(2017)) (setting a 37% 
top rate from 2018 to 2025), with I.R.C. § 1(a) (2017) (setting a 39.6% top rate 
for other years).  
 101. Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates, supra note 64.  
 102. The top 20% rate under I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D) (2017) plus the 3.8% Net 
Investment Income Tax under § 1411 (2017).  
 103. See I.R.C. § 1(j)(2) (2017) (setting a 37% top marginal rate). Additional 
taxes on different forms of income can increase the effective top rate by up to 
approximately 3.8% to around 40.8%. See supra note 47.  
 104. 37% x (100% - 20%) + 3.8% = 33.4%. 
 105. 21% + 23.8% x (100% - 21%) = 39.80%. 
 106. See infra notes 110–15 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdictions.107 A separate literature, to which we were early 
contributors, focused on the new planning opportunities to min-
imize taxes across the two systems.108 Many commentators also 
criticized the legislation’s explicit revenue and distributional 
costs.109 At the same time, the emerging conversation advocat-
ing for raising rates on the highest earners has largely not ac-
counted for the structural consequences of the 2017 tax legisla-
tion and how they may obstruct these efforts.  
This Section summarizes these common assessments of the 
2017 tax legislation in the literature to date. Part III then re-
visits these assessments in light of the progressivity ratchet 
and describes how both the corporate rate cut and Section 199A 
reflect the same mistakes in misapplying the neutrality princi-
ple and pose a similar structural obstacle to future progressive 
reforms. 
1. A Tale of Two Business Preferences  
The Design of Section 199A. Section 199A garnered the 
most sustained criticism from commentators. For instance, Pro-
fessor Daniel Shaviro—a leading critic of the provision—
acknowledges that Section 199A might have prevented some 
taxpayers from shifting to the corporate system, but nonethe-
less concludes that “[t]he pass-through rules stand front and 
centre in illustrating both the 2017 Act’s sloppiness and its lack 
of principle.”110 Shaviro argues that the provision “direct[s] 
economic activity away from some market sectors and towards 
others, for no good reason and scarcely even an articulated bad 
one.”111 In a prior work, a group of law professors and practi-
tioners—including ourselves—also described the many “games” 
that taxpayers could play to take advantage of the arbitrary 
distinctions underlying the provision, by restructuring their 
transactions and activities in order to access the preferential 
rates.112  
Even many commentators who favored other aspects of the 
legislation—and preferences for business income in general—
 
 107. See infra notes 122–38 and accompanying text. 
 108. See infra notes 145–53 and accompanying text. 
 109. See infra notes 154–64 and accompanying text. 
 110. See Shaviro, supra note 25, at 51. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Kamin et al., supra note 25, at 1462–73.  
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still criticized the design of Section 199A. For instance, the Tax 
Foundation, a leading proponent of the corporate rate cut and 
the legislation overall, wrote that “[t]he design of the pass-
through deduction leaves room for improvement” and listed a 
variety of flaws with the provision.113 Economists at the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), who praised the corporate rate 
reduction, more bluntly concluded that “[i]t would be better not 
to have the 20 percent deduction for certain types of pass-
through income.”114 Others similarly criticized Section 199A 
but did not criticize the large reduction in the corporate rate.115  
Some commentators defended Section 199A, but they were 
few and far between, especially among scholars and analysts. 
For example, in testimony before the Senate Finance Commit-
tee giving an early assessment of the recently enacted legisla-
tion, former Congressional Budget Office director Douglas 
Holtz-Eakin, argued that “it was an absolutely necessary part 
of the tax reform. You want to have a level tax playing field be-
tween the different kinds of entities. . . .”116 Not surprisingly, 
policymakers responsible for the provision and industry groups 
who benefitted from it also continued to defend the rule.117 
 
 113. GREENBERG & KAEDING, supra note 23, at 1. 
 114. Chalk et al., supra note 22, at 19. 
 115. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 4–5 (describing the corporate 
rate cut as “long overdue” while criticizing the pass-through deduction as “one 
big problem” with the tax bill). As noted supra note 23, other commentators 
may not have embraced the corporate rate cut, but they also have not high-
lighted the case for its reversal, as they propose for other changes in the 2017 
legislation. For instance, Jared Bernstein lists a set of tax increases progres-
sives should consider in addition to Representative Ocasio-Cortez’s 70% top 
rate and includes repeal of the pass-through deduction but not an increase in 
the corporate rate. See Bernstein, supra note 23. 
 116. Early Impressions of the New Tax Law, Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Fin., 115th Cong. (2018) [hereinafter Holtz-Eakin Testimony] (statement of 
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, President, American Action Forum), https://www 
.finance.senate.gov/hearings/early-impressions-of-the-new-tax-law [https:// 
perma.cc/BBF4-24RF]. 
 117. See, e.g., Early Impressions of the New Tax Law, Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Fin., 115th Cong. 4 (2018) (written statement of Sen. Hatch, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.) (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.finance.senate 
.gov/imo/media/doc/4.24%20Hatch%20Opening%20Statement%20at% 
20Finance%20Hearing%20on%20Progress%20of%20New%20Tax%20Law.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P4E7-ZGYM] (“[W]hy would we not want to get more money 
back to these business owners so that they can grow their businesses, hire 
more employees, and improve our economy?”); Breaking Down the Small Busi-
ness Pass-Through Deduction: Who Benefits and How?, NAT’L FED’N INDEP. 
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Some policymakers—though few academics or policy ana-
lysts—also justified Section 199A as maintaining neutrality be-
tween income earned in the corporate and pass-through sys-
tems.118 For example, Senator Ron Johnson (R-WI), a leading 
advocate for a pass-through tax cut, argued that “it is im-
portant to maintain the domestic competitive position and bal-
ance between large publicly-traded C corporations and ‘pass-
through entities’ (subchapter S corporations, partnerships and 
sole proprietorships).”119 Similarly, Senator Rob Portman (R-
OH), defending the pass-through tax cut on the Senate floor, 
argued that the provision was “try[ing] to have some more pari-
ty between the pass-through companies and the so-called C 
corporations.”120  
Echoing similar themes, a representative for the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants submitted testimony 
to the Senate Finance Committee supporting a pass-through 
tax cut: “If Congress, through tax reform, lowers the income tax 
rates for C corporations, all types of business entities should 
receive a rate reduction . . . . Tax reform should not disad-
vantage [pass-through] entities or require businesses to engage 
in complex entity changes to obtain favored tax status.”121  
 
BUS. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nfib.com/content/analysis/alabama/ 
breaking-down-section-small-business-pass-through-deduction-who-benefits 
-and-how/ [https://perma.cc/4N5Z-KA3T] (“The Small Business Pass-Through 
Deduction of section 199A is one of the biggest triumphs following the 2017 
passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.”). 
 118. This general concern with neutrality between the pass-through and 
corporate systems also predated the 2017 tax legislation. For instance, the 
Obama administration’s tax reform efforts suggested a similar goal of neutral-
ity in the average tax rates between the systems. See THE WHITE HOUSE & 
THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS 
TAX REFORM 7 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 JOINT REPORT], https://www 
.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/OTA-Report 
-Business-Tax-Reform-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN4L-KURN] (“The effective 
marginal tax rate on new investment by C-corporations is now 32.3 percent, 
while the effective marginal tax rate on new investment by pass-through busi-
nesses 26.4 percent . . . . The ability of large pass-through entities to take ad-
vantage of preferential tax treatment has placed businesses organizing as  
C-corporations at a disadvantage.”). 
 119. Senator Johnson made this statement in opposition to the legislation 
at the time while seeking an even larger preference for pass-through business-
es. See Sen. Johnson Press Release, supra note 23. 
 120. 163 CONG. REC. S7674 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2017) (statement of Sen. 
Portman). 
 121. See Business Tax Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 115th 
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The Corporate Rate Reduction. Unlike Section 199A, the 
corporate rate reduction earned tacit acceptance or praise from 
many quarters.122 Advocates for cutting the corporate tax rate 
often focused on the pressures from lower tax rates in foreign 
jurisdictions.123 In their 2016 proposed tax reform framework 
“A Better Way,” House Republicans called for a 20% corporate 
rate, so that “[i]nstead of having some of the highest tax rates 
on entrepreneurship and business activity in the world, the 
United States will leapfrog many of its trading partners and of-
fer globally competitive rates.”124 The Obama administration 
had also similarly proposed cutting the corporate rate—if not 
as dramatically—to 28%, in order to reduce the disparity be-
tween U.S. and foreign rates.125  
Two primary concerns motivated these proposals to reduce 
the U.S. corporate rate.126 The first concern was profit shift-
ing.127 MNCs had an incentive to report profits in lower-tax for-
 
Cong. 70 (2018) (written statement of Troy K. Lewis, CPA, GGMA, Immediate 
Past Chair, Tax Executive Committee, American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants).  
 122. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 23, at 315 (“By lowering the corporate tax 
rate from 35% to 21%, [the 2017 tax legislation] brings the U.S. statutory rate 
into closer alignment with the rates applicable in other Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations, thereby decreasing the 
incentive for businesses to locate their deductions in the United States and 
their income abroad.”). 
 123. See, e.g., GOP, A BETTER WAY, supra note 22, app. at 32 (“A high cor-
porate tax rate discourages foreign businesses from locating and investing in 
the United States and puts U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage with the 
rest of the world.”). 
 124. Id. at 23. 
 125. THE WHITE HOUSE & THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S 
FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM: AN UPDATE 5 (2016) [hereinafter 
2016 JOINT REPORT], https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/ 
Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-An-Update 
-04-04-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/QYB6-QLRD] (“Income shifting has also 
grown worse as the wedge between the U.S. statutory rate and rates in other 
countries has widened, and the absence of reform has left strategies used to 
shift income untouched.”). Unlike the changes in the 2017 legislation however, 
the Obama Administration proposal was designed to be revenue-neutral and 
preserve the same amount of revenue raised from corporations by offsetting 
the rate reduction with base-broadening measures. Id. at 17–19.  
 126. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 22 (describing competition for reported 
profits and actual investment as the two justifications that advocates offer for 
lowering the corporate tax rate). 
 127. Id.; see also Business Tax Reform, supra note 121, at 2 (statement of 
Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.) (“The current system gives 
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eign countries, even if their actual economic activity occurred in 
the United States.128 Evidence suggested that profit shifting 
was a significant and growing problem in the years leading up 
to the 2017 legislation.129  
For example, IMF economists offered the following assess-
ment of the corporate rate cut:  
The [2017 legislation] . . . mov[es] the U.S. from having been . . . an 
increasingly isolated outlier relative to other advanced and emerging 
economies to now being close to the median of tax rate imposed by 
other OECD countries . . . . Most observers regard a cut in the statu-
tory rate of corporation tax as long overdue. Many of the most signifi-
cant distortions implicit in the U.S. system—including incentives to 
shift profits outside the US (including by inverting)130 and toward ar-
tificially high leverage—are ameliorated simply by reducing the stat-
utory tax rate . . . .131 
The IMF economists’ assessment suggests that there is im-
portance to lowering the U.S. corporate rate to be more neutral 
relative to the rates in other countries.132 They note that some 
corporate income, if taxed at the full U.S. corporate rate, may 
shift to lower tax substitutes, such as profits that can be shifted 
abroad to lower tax jurisdictions.133 The corporate rate cut thus 
helps address that distortion and improve neutrality along this 
 
corporations incentives to shift income production and intangible assets, like 
intellectual property, from the U.S. to lower-taxed foreign jurisdictions, there-
by eroding our tax base.”); 2016 JOINT REPORT, supra note 125, at 4–5 (stating 
the U.S. tax system’s complexity and loopholes “allow[]  large corporations to 
reduce their tax liability by shifting profits around the globe”). 
 128. See 2016 JOINT REPORT, supra note 125, at 5. 
 129. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the 
Corporate Tax Base in the United States and Beyond, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 905, 
918–19 (2016) (estimating that revenue loss from profit shifting was growing 
and, by 2012, equaled about 30% to 45% of actual corporate receipts); Thomas 
R. Tørsløv et al., The Missing Profits of Nations tbl.2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 24701, 2018) (estimating that, as of 2015, reve-
nue loss from profit shifting equaled 14% of actual receipts). 
 130. In an inversion transaction, a parent corporation changes its residence 
from the United States to a foreign country, typically in order to reduce profits 
subject to tax in the United States. See also Chalk et al., supra note 22, at 5 
n.5 (“Corporate inversion is the process whereby a U.S. based company chang-
es its legal domicile to an offshore jurisdiction, usually by merging with a for-
eign corporation.”).  
 131. Id. at 4–5. The IMF also cited other distortions created by the corpo-
rate income tax—such as the type of economic activity—that would be reduced 
by the cut in the corporate rate. Id. at 5.  
 132. See id. at 4. 
 133. Id. at 5. 
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margin.134 Other commentators expressed this same assess-
ment, including some who specifically criticized Section 
199A.135 
Other commentators also argued that the higher U.S. rates 
discouraged the location of real economic investment in the 
United States.136 Under this view, a corporate rate cut could al-
so increase actual economic activity by encouraging corpora-
tions to invest in the United States.137 For instance, Alan Auer-
bach suggested that a corporate rate reduction could also yield 
a modest increase in real investment.138  
Some commentators did criticize the corporate rate cut.139 
Some suggested that the benefits did not justify the significant 
domestic revenue loss140 or had undesirable distributional ef-
fects.141 However, most of this critical commentary focused on 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 4 (“On the corporate side, the 
main change is a long overdue reduction of the rate to 21% . . . .”); Graetz, su-
pra note 23, at 315–16, 320 (describing the corporate rate cut as justified given 
the competitive global environment for location of profits while concluding 
that the pass-through deduction is “unprecedented” and “troublesome”). 
 136. See, e.g., Business Tax Reform, supra note 121, at 2 (statement of Sen. 
Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.) (“Our current business tax sys-
tem—and the disparity between the U.S. corporate rate and our foreign com-
petitors’ corporate rates—has created a number of problems and distortions. 
For example, the current system slows economic growth by impeding capital 
formation . . . .”); GOP, A BETTER WAY, supra note 22, at 9 (“The corporate tax 
rate represents the most important tax-related factor in a company’s decision 
to invest and locate jobs in the United States or overseas.”). 
 137. See Business Tax Reform, supra note 121, at 2 (statement of Sen. Or-
rin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.). 
 138. See Alan J. Auerbach, Measuring the Effects of Corporate Tax Cuts, 32 
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES. 97, 115–17 (2018). 
 139. See, e.g., MARR ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, NEW 
TAX LAW IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED AND WILL REQUIRE BASIC RESTRUC-
TURING (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-9-18tax 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/V92L-3JAL]. 
 140. See, e.g., id. at 2 (“These large revenue losses are irresponsible given 
the fiscal challenges the nation will face over the next several decades due to 
an aging population, health care costs that likely will continue to rise faster 
than the economy, interest rates returning to more normal levels, potential 
national security threats, and current and emerging domestic challenges such 
as large infrastructure needs that cannot be deferred indefinitely.”). 
 141. E.g., id. at 3 (“The new tax law will increase income inequality since it 
delivers far larger tax cuts to households at the top, measured as a share of 
income, than to households at the bottom or middle of the income distribu-
tion.”). 
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the immediate and explicit costs of the rate reduction.142 Other 
commentators also warned of the broader threat to progressive 
taxation from a corporate rate cut, both in the context of the 
2017 legislation and under prior law.143 This Article builds on 
that literature, by first explaining how the corporate rate cut 
was poorly targeted to activity that did not warrant perfer-
ences, and then describing why this mistargeting could interact 
with political economy constraints to limit the progressive po-
tential of future tax reform.  
2. Tax Planning Across Systems 
Other commentators described how the 2017 legislation al-
lowed taxpayers to plan across both the corporate and pass-
through systems in order to minimize their tax liabilities.144 We 
contributed to this literature with our report on the legislation 
titled The Games They Will Play.145 
In our Games report, we described how both the corporate 
and pass-through preferences allow taxpayers to avoid taxation 
at the top individual rate.146 The choice between the tax reduc-
tion opportunities under each system will depend on the cir-
 
 142. See, e.g., id. at 5–6. 
 143. For instance, Professor Daniel Shaviro cautioned that a low corporate 
rate could result in leakage from the individual income tax system. See 
SHAVIRO, supra note 22, at xii–xiii. Similarly, Professor Edward Kleinbard de-
scribed the potential importance of taxpayers “stuffing” income into corpora-
tions and avoiding the individual income tax as corporate rates fall. See gener-
ally Kleinbard, supra note 72. Eric Toder also described the challenges created 
by a corporate rate cut for individual income tax. See Eric Toder, Filling the 
Gap: Pass-Through Businesses and Tax Reform, MILKEN INST. REV., Jan.–
Mar. 2018, at 37, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
publication/138506/2001156-filling-the-gap-pass-through-businesses-and-tax 
-reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZJ5-NXLC]; Eric Toder, Eliminate the Deduc-
tion for Qualified Business Income and Require Most Firms To Be Taxed as 
Pass-Throughs, TAXVOX: BUS. TAXES (June 4, 2018) [hereinafter Toder, Re-
quire Firms To Be Taxed As Pass-Throughs], https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
taxvox/eliminate-deduction-qualified-business-income-and-require-most-firms 
-be-taxed-pass-throughs [https://perma.cc/45TF-6RRQ]. Finally, the Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities has produced a more comprehensive critique of 
the corporate rate cut in the 2017 legislation, describing how the cut would 
disproportionately benefit the top of the income distribution and encourage tax 
sheltering. See MARR ET AL., supra note 139, at 5, 17. 
 144. See, e.g., Kamin et al., supra note 25, at 1450–54, 1462–72. 
 145. See generally id. (analyzing the tax games “well-advised taxpayers” 
will play to avoid paying taxes).  
 146. Id. at 1445–73. 
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cumstances of the individual taxpayers.147 In a subsequent ar-
ticle, we then described how these games result in part from 
the economic incoherence of the categories of activities that re-
ceive preferential treatment in both the corporate and pass-
through systems.148  
Other commentators have subsequently expanded on these 
ideas to highlight the significance of the different tax reduction 
opportunities under the two systems.149 Professor James Repet-
ti described how, because of the different underlying rules and 
tax reduction opportunities, the 2017 legislation did not achieve 
neutrality between the corporate and pass-through systems. 
Rather, one system or the other will be tax-advantaged for par-
ticular taxpayers, depending on their circumstances.150 Repetti 
concluded that “the 2017 Tax Act has made tax planning more 
important in selecting an entity to conduct a business, not 
less.”151  
Similarly, Professor Bradley Borden emphasized the con-
text-specific nature of the choice of entity decision in the wake 
of the 2017 law: “Now, business structuring decisions demand a 
more comprehensive analysis due to the highly situational na-
ture of organizational form preferences.”152 Borden argued fur-
ther that, “[i]n fact, the preferred organizational form following 
the [2017 legislation] may be a combination of various enti-
ties.”153 The possibility that taxpayers may now prefer a combi-
nation of entities evidences the degree to which the 2017 legis-
 
 147. Id. 
 148. See generally Ari Glogower & David Kamin, Missing the Mark: Evalu-
ating the New Tax Preferences for Business Income, 71 NAT’L TAX J. 789, 790 
(2018) (explaining how the 2017 Tax Legislation’s “incoherent approach to de-
fining business income . . . results in business preferences to all types of eco-
nomic returns . . . if these returns are earned in certain forms and in certain 
sectors of the economy”). 
 149. See, e.g., James R. Repetti, The Impact of the 2017 Act’s Tax Rate 
Changes on Choice of Entity, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 686 (2018). 
 150. See id. at 714 (“[T]he 2017 Tax Act has made it more difficult to pre-
dict which choice of entity will have the lowest effective tax rate in the long 
run.”). 
 151. Id. at 688. 
 152. Bradley T. Borden, Income-Based Effective Tax Rates and Choice-of-
Entity Considerations Under the 2017 Tax Act, 71 NAT’L TAX J. 613, 615 
(2018). 
 153. Id. 
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lation failed to achieve neutrality across the systems, and in 
fact may have widened the cleavage for many taxpayers.  
The discussion that follows builds upon these insights in 
the Games reports and the works of Repetti and Borden. Parts 
II and III describe conceptually when the introduction of pref-
erences increase opportunities for tax planning and when they 
do not—and the consequences of these effects for progressive 
taxation in the presence of political economy constraints. Part 
IV then returns to the corporate rate cut and pass-through de-
ductions, and explains how they are examples of poorly target-
ed preferences that, if retained, are likely to constrain the pro-
gressive potential from future tax reforms. 
3. Revenue and Distributional Effects 
Finally, many commentators criticized the explicit revenue 
costs and regressive distributional effects of the 2017 legisla-
tion as a whole.154 The CBO projected that the legislation would 
cost nearly $2 trillion in the period from 2018–2028, after ac-
counting for additional interest expenses and macroeconomic 
effects.155 The legislation’s large net cost has been a focal point 
of criticism, even among commentators who generally support-
ed particular changes such as the corporate rate reduction.156  
Commentators also criticized the explicit regressive effects 
of the changes in the 2017 legislation, which generally provided 
the largest benefits to the wealthiest taxpayers.157 The Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center (TPC) estimated that the lowest 
80% of earners would receive an average tax cut of around 1.5% 
of after-tax income in 2018,158 while the top 1% would receive 
 
 154. See, e.g., MARR ET AL., supra note 139. 
 155. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2018 
TO 2028, at 106 (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-04/53651 
-outlook-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4UD-WUSP] (estimating an updated net cost 
from the legislation of approximately $1.9 trillion including interest expense 
and macroeconomic feedback). 
 156. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 23, at 323–24 (criticizing the effect on the 
deficit while generally supporting the corporate rate reduction). 
 157. See, e.g., MARR ET AL., supra note 139, at 4 (“The new tax law 
will . . . add to the growing polarization of income and wealth of recent dec-
ades.”). 
 158. Authors’ calculations based on URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., 
TABLE T18-0025, THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT (TCJA): ALL PROVISIONS AND 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX PROVISIONS (2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
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an average cut of around 3.4% of after-tax income.159 Section 
199A alone gives a tax cut over 20 times larger (as a share of 
after-tax income) for the top 1% than for the bottom 80%.160 
The distributional effect of the corporate tax cut is a matter of 
greater dispute, because this calculation depends on estimates 
of the share of corporate taxes borne, respectively, by investors, 
managers, and workers. A consensus view holds, however, that 
corporate rate cuts disproportionately benefit the corporate in-
vestors, who tend to be heavily concentrated at the top of the 
income distribution.161 
Some commentators also described additional implicit ef-
fects from the 2017 legislation’s changes that do not factor into 
the estimates of its explicit revenue and distributional ef-
fects.162 In the future, tax increases, spending reductions, or a 
combination of both will likely finance these deficit-increasing 
tax cuts.163 William Gale and researchers at the TPC show how, 




 159. Id. 
 160. Authors’ calculations based on URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., 
TABLE T18-0123, TAX BENEFIT OF THE 20 PERCENT DEDUCTION FOR QUALIFIED 
PASS-THROUGH BUSINESS INCOME, (2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
model-estimates/individual-income-tax-expenditures-october-2018/t18-0213 
-tax-benefit-20-percent [https://perma.cc/3TBL-C98C]. 
 161. See CHYE-CHING HUANG & BRANDON DEBOT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL-
ICY PRIORITIES, CORPORATE TAX CUTS SKEW TO SHAREHOLDERS AND CEOS, 
NOT WORKERS AS ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS 4 tbl.1 (2017), https://www 
.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-20-17tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/RB4K 
-9TZS] (showing the allocation of the corporate tax burden by a variety of es-
timators); JAMES R. NUNNS, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., HOW TPC 
DISTRIBUTES THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 18 tbl.8 (2012), https://www 
.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/how-tpc-distributes-corporate-income-tax 
[https://perma.cc/E83K-EHFM] (evaluating the evidence on the burden of the 
corporate income tax and concluding that rate reductions, as opposed to more 
direct incentives for investment, are particularly regressive with over 50% of 
the benefit going to the top 1%); see also Joel Slemrod, Is This Tax Reform, or 
Just Confusion?, 32 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 73, 90 (2018) (“[T]o assert that 
[corporate tax reductions] will largely benefit workers is, in my opinion, a 
stretch that the empirical literature does not substantiate.”). 
 162. See, e.g., WILLIAM GALE ET AL., URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., 
WINNERS AND LOSERS AFTER PAYING FOR THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 1–2 
(Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/winners-and 
-losers-after-paying-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/full [https://perma.cc/8J67-R2AG]. 
 163. Id. at 1. 
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middle and the bottom will likely bear a disproportionate bur-
den of the legislation’s costs once these future deficit reduction 
measures are taken into account, while taxpayers at the top of 
the distribution will likely enjoy a significant net benefit.164  
The discussion in Part IV returns to a variation of this 
question of future financing and explains how the 2017 legisla-
tion’s structure will obstruct future efforts to finance its costs 
and generate additional revenue through future progressive 
taxes, thereby highlighting additional dimensions of Gale’s 
finding. Before returning to the discussion of the 2017 tax legis-
lation and its structural obstacles to progressive reforms, how-
ever, Part II and III first describe the theory of the progressivi-
ty ratchet in abstract terms.  
II.  NEUTRALITY AND TAX PREFERENCES   
This Part describes well-known principles of efficient tax 
design in the public finance literature. It then builds upon 
these principles to discuss the case of tax preferences intro-
duced in response to other preexisting preferences in the tax 
law. This discussion explains—by revisiting the neutrality 
principle—how a new tax preference introduced in response to 
an initial preference can either increase or decrease efficiency 
in the tax system, and emphasizes the first-order significance 
of the particular legal rules governing access to the preferences 
in determining the effect of a new preference (such as the cor-
porate rate reduction or Section 199A). The discussion in this 
Part describes the harm, within an optimal tax framework, of 
introducing poorly targeted preferences. Part III then builds 
from this analysis to describe the how these effects can interact 
with political constraints to result in less progressive outcomes. 
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES  
This Section first describes why, as a general matter, the 
tax system should treat close substitutes similarly in order to 
minimize costly tax avoidance. The following Sections then il-
lustrate the challenges in applying this basic principle in the 
case of real-world tax rules that define the taxable base in dif-
ferent ways and that offer unique tax reduction opportunities.  
 
 164. Id. at 9–11, 15–16, 18–29 tbls. 1–12 (describing how the distributional 
effects of the House and Senate bills change under different possible financing 
scenarios). 
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The public finance literature offers a basic principle for tax 
design: raising taxes will generate greater tax avoidance—
resulting in revenue loss and efficiency costs—to the degree 
taxpayers can escape tax increases by changing the form or 
substance of their activities.165 This broad statement can be 
understood through three factors described below: (1) the 
amount of the change in a specific tax base resulting from a 
change in tax rates on that base, often referred to as the elas-
ticity of the tax base; (2) the amount of revenue lost per unit of 
decline in the amount of the tax base as rates rise, which this 
Article refers to as the “tax rate differential”; and (3) the effi-
ciency cost of raising additional taxes through a particular tax 
rule, often referred to in the literature as the “marginal effi-
ciency cost of taxation.”166 In turn, these three concepts lead to 
the “neutrality principle” which provides that close substitutes 
for the same activities should be taxed more similarly than 
should activities which are not close substitutes. 
Elasticity of the Tax Base. The elasticity of the tax base re-
fers to the amount that the tax base changes resulting from a 
change in the tax rates on that base, as taxpayers respond to a 
rate change by changing the form or substance of their taxable 
activities.167 In the case of the income tax, this measure is often 
called the “elasticity of taxable income.”168 
Elasticity of the tax base depends upon both “margins” in 
the tax law and “substitutes” for the taxable activity. A margin 
in the tax law distinguishes between different taxable activi-
ties, and potentially treats one activity less favorably than the 
other.169 The term “substitute” in this context refers to an al-
ternative to a taxable activity that a taxpayer may favor if the 
 
 165. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of Taxable Income with 
Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 3, 4 (2012) 
(“Taxes trigger a host of behavioral responses intended to minimize the bur-
den on the individual. In the absence of externalities or other market failure, 
and putting aside income effects, all such responses are sources of inefficien-
cy . . . .”). 
 166. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 167. See Saez et al., supra note 165, at 4. 
 168. See id. at 4 (describing elasticity of taxable income as a “worthy topic 
of investigation” for its ability to capture behavioral responses to taxation). 
 169. David Weisbach has referred to “margins” in the tax system as “lines” 
and the challenge of defining those margins or lines as the “line-drawing prob-
lem.” See Weisbach, supra note 11, at 71. 
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cost of the taxable activity increases.170 The elasticity of a tax 
base in turn measures the responsiveness of a taxpayer to 
higher taxes on one taxable activity, as they shift across a mar-
gin in the tax law to substitute into another activity not subject 
to the same tax increase.171  
The elasticity of a given base therefore depends on the 
availability of substitutes that are treated more favorably and 
the sensitivity of taxpayers to changes in the relative costs of 
different activities. If a close substitute exists for a taxable ac-
tivity, then that taxable activity will have a higher elasticity. If 
the taxable activity does not have a close substitute, then its 
elasticity will be lower.  
To illustrate, consider the simple example of an economy 
with only two activities—Activity A and Activity B—and an in-
come tax system that taxes the income from each. Assume that 
Activity A and Activity B both yield $10 million of income. 
Lawmakers then introduce a margin in the tax law that treats 
the two activities differently and raise the tax rate on Activity 
A—but not on Activity B (which is now preferentially taxed)—
by 1%. The efficiency costs and revenue effects of this rate in-
crease will depend, in part, on the degree to which Activity B is 
a close substitute for Activity A. If the tax increase on Activity A 
will induce taxpayers to substitute Activity B for Activity A to 
receive more favorable tax treatment—that is, if Activity A is 
relatively elastic—then the tax increase on Activity A will gen-
erate greater efficiency costs and raise less revenue. 
For example, assume $500,000 of income from Activity A 
may shift to Activity B because of the 1% tax rate increase on 
Activity A. Calculating the resulting revenue loss and efficiency 
cost from that substitution then requires one additional piece of 
information: the magnitude of the tax rate differential between 
the two activities.  
The Tax Rate Differential. The tax rate differential 
measures the magnitude of the difference in tax rates applied 
to two taxable activities.172 That is, the tax rate differential 
 
 170. See, e.g., id. at 77 (“Suppose cars are taxed but other methods of 
transportation are not. People will switch to close substitutes for cars, say, 
small trucks.”); see also ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 10 and accompanying 
text.  
 171. See, e.g., Saez et al., supra note 165, at 6 (defining elasticity of taxable 
income).  
 172. Saez et al. describe the role of this tax rate differential in analyzing 
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may be understood as measuring the magnitude of the margin 
separating the two activities. Returning to the example above, 
assume that, prior to the 1% tax increase on Activity A, the 
rules taxed Activity A at a 30% rate and Activity B at a 20% 
rate. This system therefore raised $5 million in total revenues: 
$3 million from taxing income from Activity A173 and $2 million 
from taxing the income from Activity B.174  
Policymakers can then calculate the additional revenue 
generated by the 1% increase in the tax rate on income from 
Activity A through two steps. The first step considers the reve-
nue effect on a purely static basis, assuming no substitution to 
Activity B. In the example above, the static effect of the 1% in-
crease would yield an additional $100,000 of revenue.175 The 
second step calculates the revenue loss resulting from taxpay-
ers responding to the higher tax on income from Activity A by 
substituting to Activity B. In the example above, the 1% in-
crease on income from Activity A causes taxpayers to shift 
$500,000 of income from Activity A to Activity B.176 This 
$500,000 of shifted income multiplied by the tax rate differen-
tial measures the amount of revenue loss from the shift. In this 
case, the differential equals 11%177 and the total revenue loss 
from the shift equals $55,000.178 As a result, the 1% tax in-
crease on income from Activity A will yield $45,000 in net addi-
tional revenues.179  
 
the effects of tax base shifting on revenue and social costs. See id. at 10–12. 
They frame the positive revenue generated from the alternative tax base 
which taxpayers shift to as a “fiscal externality.” The key issue, as they define 
it, in assessing the effects of base shifting is the net revenue lost due to this 
fiscal externality. Id. We frame this same issue in terms of the tax rate differ-
ential—the differential between the tax rate on the initial base and on the 
base into which the income shifts. 
 173. 30% of the $10 million base of taxable income from Activity A.  
 174. 20% of the $10 million base of taxable income from Activity B. 
 175. 1% of the unchanged $10 million base of taxable income from Activity 
A.  
 176. That is, now taxpayers will earn only $9.5 million of income from Ac-
tivity A and $10.5 million of income from Activity B.  
 177. The 31% rate on Activity A less the 20% rate on Activity B.  
 178. 11% of the $500,000 of shifted income that is now taxed at the lower 
20% rate.  
 179. The $100,000 static revenue increase calculated in the first step less 
the $55,000 revenue loss from shifting into Activity B calculated in the second 
step. In this case, $9.5 million of income from Activity A is taxed at a 31% rate 
and $10.5 million of income from Activity B is taxed at a 20% rate, for total tax 
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The Marginal Efficiency Cost of Taxation. The revenue loss 
from substitution induced by higher tax rates—reflecting the 
combined effect of the elasticity of the tax bases and the tax 
rate differential—can approximate what the literature terms 
the “marginal efficiency cost of taxation.”180 This term 
measures the efficiency cost to individuals that results from 
raising a fixed amount of additional revenue from a particular 
tax base.181  
To understand why revenue loss from substitution can ap-
proximate the efficiency costs from raising additional revenue, 
consider again the example above. In order to avoid a small tax 
rate increase of 1% on income from Activity A, taxpayers re-
spond by shifting a portion of their income from Activity A to 
income from Activity B.  
Prior to the tax increase, the tax rate differential between 
the two bases already equaled 10%, but a differential of this 
magnitude was insufficient to induce taxpayers to shift the 
$500,000 of income from Activity A to Activity B.182 That is, 
 
revenue of $5,045,000, or $45,000 more than the $5 million of revenue raised 
before the tax increase.  
 180. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Methodological Issues in Measuring and Inter-
preting Taxable Income Elasticities, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 773, 777 (1998) 
(“[T]axpayers will undertake behavior that reduces tax liability up to the point 
that the marginal cost equals the marginal tax saving. In the real substitution 
case, the cost is an otherwise unattractive bundle of goods. With avoidance, 
the cost may be expenditures on professional assistance. With evasion, the 
cost may be exposure to the uncertainty of an audit and any attendant penal-
ties for detected evasion.”); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of 
Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 IMF STAFF PAPERS 
172, 186 (1996) (“The critical question is how to evaluate, from a social point of 
view, the leaked dollars. . . . [A] rational taxpayer will be ready to sacrifice up 
to, but no more than, one dollar in order to save a dollar of taxes.”). Important-
ly, the revenue loss only equals the efficiency cost under certain conditions 
which will not always hold true. One is that those avoiding the tax increase 
are not constrained “at a corner solution.” An example of a “corner solution” is 
when a taxpayer fully shifts all income out of the tax base, in which case the 
effort put into that planning may be less than the amount of taxes saved. Id. 
at 186–87. 
 181. See, e.g., Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 180, at 185 (defining the 
marginal efficiency cost of funds “as the cost to the society of increasing tax 
revenue by a dollar, through a change in the tax rate or other fiscal instru-
ment”). As used in this Article, “efficiency cost” refers to the resources expend-
ed by individual taxpayers to avoid taxation.  
 182. They might already have shifted other income in response to the tax 
rate differential, but they had not yet shifted the additional $500,000 in re-
sponse to the subsequent tax increase. 
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even prior to the 1% rate increase, taxpayers could have saved 
$50,000 in taxes by shifting the $500,000 of income from Activi-
ty A to Activity B, but they didn’t make this shift. Shifting to 
Activity B must have entailed additional effort or non-tax costs 
which exceeded the $50,000 tax savings to be gained. The addi-
tional 1% increase in the tax on income from Activity A, howev-
er, induces the taxpayers to make the shift. That is, the addi-
tional $5,000 tax savings from shifting the income to Activity B 
makes the shift worthwhile. Of the taxpayer’s total $55,000 in 
savings from the shift, they must therefore experience a gain of 
no more than $5,000, while the government loses the full 
$55,000 in revenue. As a result, the net efficiency cost of the 
shift (measured as the difference between the revenue loss to 
the government and the benefit that the taxpayers enjoy from 
tax avoidance) is between $50,000 and $55,000.183  
Policymakers can then compare this cost to the net revenue 
raised from the tax increase. In this case the net revenue gain 
of $45,000 entailed an efficiency cost of between $50,000 and 
$55,000. That is, each additional dollar of revenue raised from 
increasing the rate on Activity A resulted in slightly more than 
one dollar of efficiency cost.  
Gaining additional revenue at a high efficiency cost may 
still be desirable from the policymaker’s perspective. Whether 
to undertake the trade-off depends on the effect on overall so-
cial welfare. Specifically, it depends on the trade-off between 
the social value of the $45,000 in transfers, public goods, and 
services that will be financed by the additional revenue versus 
the social welfare loss from the $50,000 to $55,000 in efficiency 
cost to the taxpayer. That trade-off can partially depend on who 
receives the benefits from the revenue raised and who bears the 
efficiency cost of taxation. For instance, if the efficiency costs 
are borne by taxpayers at the top of the income distribution 
and the revenue benefits members of society at the bottom, that 
trade-off might still significantly enhance social welfare. One 
view in the literature argues that the efficiency costs at the top 
translate into little social welfare loss, because of the diminish-
 
 183. If the taxpayers realize almost the full $5,000 benefit from the shift, 
then the net social costs will be the $55,000 revenue loss less the approximate-
ly $5,000 taxpayer benefit, or $50,000. If the taxpayers realize almost none of 
the benefit from the shift, then the net social cost will be the $55,000 revenue 
loss less the approximately $0 taxpayer benefit, or $55,000.  
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ing higher marginal utility of income and because society 
should place greater weight on the welfare of the least well 
off.184 More broadly, however, in the presence of a higher mar-
ginal efficiency cost of taxation, these benefits from raising ad-
ditional revenue entail greater efficiency cost than they would 
otherwise. Most views would agree that this scenario would be 
less desirable than an alternative scenario where policymakers 
can raise the same amount of revenue from the same taxpayers 
at a lower efficiency cost. 
The marginal efficiency cost of taxation varies with a num-
ber of factors under policymakers’ control. Policymakers might 
reduce the elasticity of the tax base by reducing margins or 
making it harder to shift across them.185 They might also re-
duce the tax differential across the margins.186 Policymakers 
 
 184. Empirical studies support for the notion that the marginal utility of 
income falls on average as income rises. See, e.g., R. Layard et al., The Mar-
ginal Utility of Income, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1846, 1857 (2008) (surveying evi-
dence to conclude that the marginal utility of income declines on average fast-
er than in proportion to the increase in income). But see Sarah B. Lawsky, On 
the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904, 
907–08 (2011) (agreeing that “some empirical evidence supports declining 
marginal utility,” while describing how “other evidence also suggests that cer-
tain individuals actually experience increasing marginal utility, at least over 
some range of income”). This assumption of declining marginal utility is often 
adopted in optimal tax analysis. See, e.g., Diamond & Saez, supra note 7, at 
168–70 (assuming, for purposes of calculating the optimal top tax rate, that 
the “marginal social weight on consumption” is small for those at the top of the 
income distribution because of the declining marginal utility of income). The 
assumption of low social value from additional income at the top of the distri-
bution can also derive from a combination of declining marginal utility of re-
sources and simply putting less weight on the additional utility of those with 
the most resources as compared to those with less. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 52–93 (rev. ed. 1999) (defining and justifying the “differ-
ence principle” under which “the higher expectations of those better situated 
are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expec-
tations of the least advantaged members of society”). 
 185. See Slemrod, supra note 180, at 779 (“[T]he characterization of an op-
timal tax system must include not only the tax rate structure but myriad other 
instruments that subsume, but are not limited by, the definition of taxable in-
come. The elasticity of taxable income will depend on the setting of these other 
instruments. It is not an immutable function of preferences.” (emphasis omit-
ted)); Joel Slemrod & Wojciech Kopczuk, The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable In-
come, 84 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 94 (2002) (describing the benefit of reducing the 
elasticity of taxable income and then deriving an “optimal elasticity” based on 
how a reduction trades off against other factors such as administrative costs). 
 186. See, e.g., infra Part IV.D.2 (describing possible rule-based solutions to 
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could attempt to eliminate margins entirely and tax activity 
the same187 but this approach could interfere with other norma-
tive goals such as fairness and administrative efficiency.188 In a 
real-world tax system that contains margins, substitution 
across those margins, and tax differentials, the “neutrality 
principle” provides another way for policymakers to minimize 
the marginal efficiency cost of taxation.  
The Neutrality Principle. The neutrality principle generally 
provides that close substitutes for the same activities should be 
taxed more neutrally—with smaller tax differentials—than 
should activities which are not close substitutes.189 This rule 
derives from the marginal efficiency cost of taxation analysis 
described above, and how this cost depends upon both the elas-
ticity of the taxable activities and the tax rate differential be-
tween them.190 If two activities are close substitutes—and 
therefore a small rate differential induces a substantial shift 
from one activity to the other—policymakers should instead re-
duce the rate differential, even if that means increasing the 
rate differential with other activities that are not close substi-
tutes. 
Consider again the example of Activity A and Activity B, 
and now add a third, Activity C, which is taxed at a preferential 
rate.191 Policymakers now must consider how to tax Activity A 
and Activity B in light of this low rate of tax on Activity C.  
 
“break the ratchet” by discouraging shifting across margins and reducing tax 
differentials across margins).  
 187. See infra Part IV.D.2.  
 188. The only systems that would not have any margins across which tax-
payers could substitute to reduce tax liability involve what are sometimes 
called “lump sum” taxes or “endowment taxes”—where the tax liability is de-
termined by immutable characteristics. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Tax-
ing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145, 1148 (2006) (considering the merits of en-
dowment taxes). For a deeper exploration of some of the trade-offs in reducing 
elasticity, see Slemrod & Kopczuk, supra note 185. For a discussion of corpora-
tion integration methods, which could at least reduce—even if not eliminate—
the margins in the taxation of business income, see infra notes 313–19 and 
accompanying text.  
 189. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.  
 190. See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text. 
 191. Assume that policymakers cannot or choose not to change this rate. 
For example, this scenario could represent the case of Congress responding to 
low taxed foreign income with a corporate rate cut, or responding to the corpo-
rate rate cut with Section 199A.  
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Assume, in the extreme cases, that Activity A is a close 
substitute for Activity C, but Activity B is not. In this case, Ac-
tivity A should be taxed at a rate close to that for Activity C 
while Activity B could potentially be taxed at a significantly 
higher rate than both Activity A and Activity C. The reason for 
this is that policymakers cannot gain much revenue from tax-
ing Activity A more than Activity C and any revenue gained 
from higher taxes on Activity A will entail a higher efficiency 
cost. Policymakers can tax Activity B, by contrast, at a higher 
rate, since it is not a substitute for Activity A or Activity C. On 
the other hand, if Activity A and Activity B are close substitutes 
for each other but not for Activity C, then policymakers should 
tax Activity A and Activity B more neutrally, and should not 
necessarily align the tax rate with the rate on Activity C. These 
variations illustrate the basic point that the relative taxation of 
the different activities—and the desirability for greater neu-
trality among them—depends on the degree to which the activi-
ties are close substitutes.192  
B. THE VARYING EFFECT OF NEW TAX PREFERENCES 
The neutrality framework can help explain the likely effect 
of the new business tax preferences in the 2017 legislation. 
This Section develops an analytical framework for evaluating 
how a new preference interacts with preexisting preferences in 
the tax rules. In theory, the introduction of a new preference in 
this context can, in fact, be consistent with the neutrality prin-
ciple—and thus decrease the efficiency cost of funds and in-
crease the revenue that can be raised at any given set of rates. 
This desirable result, however, requires careful targeting of the 
new preference in a way that may practically be difficult to 
achieve through the drafting of tax rules. At the same time, the 
introduction of a mistargeted preference can compound the ef-
fect of the preexisting preference and result in even greater ef-
ficiency costs, and lower revenue raised, from the chosen tax 
rates.  
 
 192. See also Weisbach, supra note 11, at 77 (using a similar example of an 
initial distortionary tax on cars then justifying a second distortionary tax on 
trucks since they are close substitutes, where the addition of the second distor-
tionary tax on trucks reduces distortions on net). 
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1. Multiple Preferences and Targeting 
The neutrality framework suggests that if the tax rules al-
ready contain a preference for some sector of the base that can-
not be eliminated, then additional preferences may help miti-
gate the efficiency costs and revenue loss resulting from the 
first preference. Two (or more) preferences could be better than 
one if the additional preferences result in close substitutes be-
ing treated more neutrally than are non-substitutes. 
Critically, that correct application of the neutrality frame-
work requires evaluation of the legal rules defining the various 
preferences and exactly what activities they target. To properly 
apply the neutrality principle, policymakers must distinguish 
between preferences that improve the neutrality of the tax sys-
tem (and in fact treat close substitutes more similarly) and 
preferences that expand the scope of the preferences to other 
portions of the tax base and therefore compound the efficiency 
costs and revenue loss. The mistargeting may result from the 
poor design of tax rules or the innate challenges of effectively 
defining and preferencing particular activities without prefer-
encing others as well. In the case of such mistargeting, two (or 
more) preferences can be worse than just one.  
A new tax preference can help mitigate the effect of anoth-
er preference if: (1) the new preferential rate properly targets 
activity that would otherwise shift over to another low-taxed 
activity and (2) the new preferential rate is still set higher than 
the rate on the other low taxed activity. Under those circum-
stances, a new preference effectively reduces the efficiency 
costs and revenue loss from the first preferenced activity. The 
opposite occurs, however, if the new preference doesn’t meet 
those criteria, and is either poorly targeted to substitutable ac-
tivity or offers an even larger tax benefit than one for the first 
preferenced activity. In this case, the second preference will re-
sult in even higher efficiency costs and lower revenue raised 
from tax increases on the remainder of the tax base.  
To illustrate the different effects of properly targeted and 
mistargeted preferences, and how the additional preference can 
either mitigate or compound the efficiency costs and revenue 
loss from the initial preference, consider again the case of Ac-
tivity A and Activity B. Assume again that income from Activity 
B is taxed at a fixed 20% and cannot be increased. As illustrat-
ed in Part II.A., this preference reduces the revenue-raising po-
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tential and increases the efficiency costs from a tax increase on 
income from Activity A.  
If policymakers cannot eliminate the preference for Activity 
B, they may be able to mitigate its effect by introducing a new 
preference for some subset of the taxpayers engaged in Activity 
A who could in fact shift to Activity B at a relatively low cost. In 
the example above, $500,000 of income shifts from Activity A to 
Activity B when the tax rate on income from Activity A increas-
es by 1% from 30% to 31%. Now, imagine that policymakers 
had perfect information and knew exactly which taxpayers 
would make the switch to Activity B when the tax rate on in-
come from Activity A increases from 30% to 31%. The policy-
makers could then exempt those taxpayers from the tax rate 
increase (call them the “Activity A 30% Cohort”). In this case, 
raising the tax by 1% on the remainder of the income from Ac-
tivity A produces no substitution at all—and therefore no effi-
ciency costs—and generates $95,000 in additional revenue,193 
far more than in the example above of an across-the-board rate 
increase for all income from Activity A. In this case, the second 
preference mitigates the effect of the progressivity ratchet re-
sulting from the initial preference. The new preference for the 
Activity A 30% Cohort could in fact justify even higher rates on 
the remaining income from Activity A than would otherwise be 
the case.194 This higher rate could consequently generate even 
more revenue to finance government spending at a relatively 
low efficiency cost.  
In an ideal setting with perfect information and no admin-
istrative challenges, policymakers could develop a series of 
highly targeted preferences that minimize costly substitution 
responses by taxpayers. For example, even the 30% rate on in-
come from Activity A may induce some substitution to Activity 
B, which might be discouraged by lowering the rate on income 
from Activity A to 29%. Policymakers could design a second 
targeted preference to eliminate this shifting as well, by prefer-
encing an “Activity A 29% Cohort.” Policymakers could make 
the same adjustments to target tax preferences to any subset of 
 
 193. The 1% additional tax on the remaining $9.5 million of income from 
Activity A that is not attributable to Activity A 30% Cohort.  
 194. Policymakers could raise the rates on the remaining income from Ac-
tivity A up to the point that the higher rates induce further substitution to Ac-
tivity B or other behavioral responses.  
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taxpayers or activities who would otherwise switch their activi-
ty at each rate level, thus minimizing the inefficient substitu-
tion from high-taxed Activity A to low-taxed Activity B.  
This policy response simply illustrates the neutrality prin-
ciple, that policymakers should reduce the tax rate differential 
on close substitutes. In the real-world, however, policymakers 
do not have the information necessary to perfectly target tax 
preferences. Policymakers may also be constrained by the in-
nate challenges of writing tax rules that narrowly define specif-
ic taxpayers and economic activities. Imprecise targeting of tax 
preferences, however, can have the adverse consequence of 
compounding, rather than mitigating, the effects of an initial 
preference.195 First, a poorly targeted preference can provide a 
windfall to some taxpayers who would not have shifted their 
activity. This lost revenue would necessitate lower government 
spending or higher taxes at other points in the system. Second, 
the poorly targeted preference could provide a new opportunity 
for substitution that never existed before. Both of these effects 
can raise the marginal efficiency cost of taxation on the re-
mainder of the base and reduce the revenue raising potential 
from higher rates.196 This is because higher taxes would be fo-
cused on a smaller base which may still be subject to the same 
avoidance as before while the new preference offers taxpayers 
an additional opportunity to avoid the top rate.197  
Consider again the case of Activity A and Activity B, with 
$10 million of income earned from each. Assume that policy-
makers attempt to mitigate the effects of a preference for in-
come from Activity B by creating a new category of tax, called 
“Activity A Preferred” which is taxed at a 25% rate. Policymak-
ers draft complex rules to differentiate between Activity A and 
Activity A Preferred, attempting to target those taxpayers most 
 
 195. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 197. This example illustrates how the 1% rate increase on the residual 
base will end up raising less revenue and at a greater efficiency cost than be-
fore. The efficiency cost is amplified if the revenue loss from the “windfall” tax 
cut is recovered through other tax rate increases which would generate yet 
more substitution. The revenue loss and welfare cost associated with a given 
change in the tax rate would rise further as rates increase. In other words, the 
next percentage point tax increase would tend to cause even more substitution 
than the last one, as under certain conditions the distortion generated by tax 
rate differentials is proportional to the square of the rate differential. See 
ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 10, at 554. 
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likely to shift from Activity A to Activity B as a result of a fur-
ther increase in the tax rate. Have the policymakers mitigated 
the negative effects of the preference for Activity B by creating 
a situation where higher taxes on income from Activity A would 
raise more revenue at a lower efficiency cost? This depends 
whether the policymakers effectively targeted the new prefer-
ence.  
First, consider the case of complete mistargeting. In this 
situation, the preference would provide a windfall to any tax-
payers who automatically qualify for Activity A Preferred even 
though they would not have substituted toward Activity B in 
response to a 1% rate increase on income from Activity A. As-
sume that the windfall encompasses one-fourth, or $2.5 million, 
of the Activity A tax base, leaving a residual base of $7.5 mil-
lion in Activity A who do not automatically qualify for the new 
preference.  
The 1% tax rate increase on income from Activity A would 
then, before taking into account any additional substitution, 
apply to this smaller residual base. If no further substitution 
occurred, this 1% increase would raise $75,000 in additional 
revenue. Because of the complete mistargeting, however, the 
same $500,000 in income would still substitute from Activity A 
to Activity B, reducing revenue by $55,000.198 Also assume that, 
due to the mistargeting, an additional $200,000 of income now 
shifts from Activity A to Activity A Preferred, reducing revenue 
by an additional $12,000,199 leaving a tax base of only $6.8 mil-
lion in Activity A. Altogether, the substitution reduces revenue 
by $67,000, and the net revenue raised falls to $8,000.200 The 
tax increase raises relatively little revenue at a relatively high 
 
 198. The $500,000 that shifts from Activity A to Activity B multiplied by 
the tax rate differential on these bases of 11%. 
 199. The $200,000 that shifts from Activity A to Activity A Preferred multi-
plied by the tax rate differential on these bases of 6%. 
 200. Before the 1% increase on income from Activity A, this package of 
rates would tax $7.5 million of income from Activity A at 30%, $2.5 million of 
income from Activity A Preferred at 25%, and $10 million of income from Activ-
ity B at 20%, for total revenue raised of $4,875,000. After the 1% increase in-
duces additional shifting from Activity A, the package of rates would tax $6.8 
million of income from Activity A at 31%, $2.7 million of income from Activity 
A Preferred at 25%, and $10.5 million of income from Activity B at 20%, for to-
tal revenue raised of $4,883,000, or only $8000 more than before the 1% rate 
increase.  
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efficiency cost.201 In this case, the poorly targeted preference 
substantially compounds—rather than mitigates—the effect of 
the initial preference for Activity B. 
By contrast, assume the policymakers more accurately—
though still imperfectly—target Activity A Preferred to the de-
sired group of taxpayers. In this case, Activity A Preferred pri-
marily benefits the taxpayers who would otherwise shift from 
Activity A to Activity B if the rate of tax on income from Activity 
A increases. Assume that Activity A Preferred automatically 
preferences only $500,000 of income from Activity A, leaving 
$9.5 million in the residual Activity A base. Further, assume 
that most of that $500,000 would otherwise have shifted from 
Activity A to Activity B if the rate on income from Activity A in-
creased further. In this case, a 1% tax increase on this residual 
in Activity A, before accounting for further shifting, would raise 
$95,000 of revenue. Assume that, because the preference is 
more accurately targeted, the 1% tax increase on income from 
Activity A only results in a shift of $100,000 of income from the 
residual Activity A to Activity B, and only $50,000 from Activity 
A to Activity A Preferred. The revenue loss from the substitu-
tion would now only be $14,000,202 and the net revenue raised 
from the tax rate changes would increase to $81,000.203  
In this case, the addition of Activity A Preferred mitigated 
the adverse effects of the Activity B tax preference. Additional 
revenue can now be raised from Activity A at a lower efficiency 
 
 201. In this case, the efficiency cost to the taxpayer from the additional 
substitution would be between $60,000 and $67,000. This reflects the fact that 
taxpayers substituting chose not to make the switch to Activity A and Activity 
A Preferred at the previous tax differentials of 10% and 5% respectively—
meaning that there must have been transaction costs that outweighed the tax 
benefits at the previous differentials. 
 202. The $100,000 that shifts from Activity A to Activity B times the tax 
rate differential on these bases of 11%, plus the $50,000 that shifts from Activ-
ity A to Activity A Preferred, times the tax rate differential on these bases of 
6%. 
 203. In this case, before the 1% increase on income Activity A, this package 
of rates would tax $9.5 million of income from Activity A at 30%, $500,000 of 
income from Activity A Preferred at 25%, and $10 million of income from Activ-
ity B at 20%, for total revenue raised of $4,975,000. After the 1% increase in-
duces a minimal degree of additional shifting from Activity A, the package of 
rates would tax $9,350,000 of income from Activity A at 31%, $550,000 of in-
come from Activity A Preferred at 25%, and $10.1 million of income from Activ-
ity B at 20%, for total revenue raised of $5,056,000, or $81,000 more than be-
fore the 1% rate increase.  
  
1546 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1499 
 
cost than was possible before the introduction of the prefer-
ence.204  
These examples illustrate how a new preference can either 
mitigate or compound the negative effects from an initial pref-
erence—the higher efficiency cost and less revenue raised from 
taxes on other portions of the tax base. This varying effect of a 
new preference depends on the legal rules defining the prefer-
ence, and whether it is effectively targeted to the activities that 
would have otherwise shifted into the previously preferenced 
activity.  
2. Multiple Preferences with a Choice in Tax Systems  
This framework for evaluating when a new preference in-
troduced in response to an initial preference compounds or mit-
igates the effects of an initial preference may be expanded to 
consider the case of a choice in tax systems. Applying the 
framework in this scenario also helps explain why it is a mis-
take to pursue average rate neutrality across the corporate and 
pass-through systems, as is sometimes suggested.205 In fact, 
this mistaken pursuit can increase the efficiency costs of rais-
ing revenue in both systems for the same reason that poorly 
targeted new preferences would have this effect in the general 
case described in the preceding Section. 
By “choice in tax systems,” this Article refers to the ability 
of taxpayers to select different methods for measuring and tax-
ing the same activities. There may be independent reasons why 
the tax rules should allow a choice of tax systems in certain 
cases. Taxing some taxpayers and their activities in one system 
and others in another may provide administrative and compli-
ance benefits to both taxpayers and the government. For exam-
ple, as described above, the corporate tax system is often justi-
fied as a more administrable method of taxing large entities 
with many owners and frequent changes in ownership.206 Offer-
ing taxpayers and entities a choice between tax systems may be 
 
 204. The social cost would be between $12,500 and $14,000, again reflect-
ing the fact that the revenue-losing substitution was not undertaken at the 
prior rate differentials. 
 205. See, e.g., Holtz-Eakin Testimony, supra note 116; 2012 JOINT REPORT, 
supra note 118, at 7. 
 206. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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desirable if it allows them to select into the most administra-
tively efficient systems for their circumstances.  
If policymakers decide to preserve a choice in tax system, 
they must then determine how rates in the two systems should 
relate. One approach would be to closely align the tax rates in 
the two systems for each individual taxpayer and activity, so 
that the choice between systems doesn’t generate opportunities 
for tax-reducing substitution. This approach might not be fea-
sible, however, if the administrative benefits from preserving 
separate systems require differential tax treatment of at least 
some activities.207 If policymakers must accept differential tax 
treatment of some activities across the two systems, they must 
then determine how to the optimize tax rates across the sys-
tems. The neutrality principle described above applies here as 
well: treat close substitutes more similarly, as compared to ac-
tivities that are not close substitutes. The neutrality principle 
does not suggest, however, that policymakers should equalize 
average rates across the two systems. This approach can in fact 
violate the neutrality principle and compound the revenue loss 
and efficiency costs resulting from taxpayer’s substitution re-
sponses. 
For example, consider the scenario in Table 1 below, with 
two activities, Activity A and Activity B, which can each be 
taxed under System 1 or System 2. System 1 and System 2 both 
tax Activity A at the same 30% rate. System 1 also taxes Activi-
ty B at a 30% rate, but System 2 taxes Activity B at a prefer-
enced 20% rate.208 To improve neutrality between the two sys-
tems, policymakers then consider introducing a new preference 
in System 1: a lower 25% rate on income from “Activity A Pre-




 207. Part IV.D.2 revisits this option of aligning tax rates for activities and 
taxpayers across the two systems by considering proposals to “integrate” the 
pass-through and corporate systems. This approach could align tax rates while 
retaining some of the administrative benefits from having two systems. See 
infra notes 312–18 and accompanying text. 
 208. Assume, for example, that the administrative advantages of a sepa-
rate System 2 also necessitate a lower tax on Activity B in System 2. One real-
world example of such a preference could be the corporate system’s deferral 
opportunities, which may allow taxpayers to reduce or eliminate the second 
individual layer of tax.  
  




The introduction of the preference for Activity A Preferred 
may achieve greater average rate neutrality between the two 
systems.209 This fact, however, is immaterial for purposes of 
properly applying the neutrality principle. The analysis of 
whether the introduction of the preference for Activity A Pre-
ferred follows the same structure as the analysis of any new 
preference introduced in response to an initial preference, as 
described in the preceding Section.  
Properly applying the neutrality principle in this case simi-
larly requires evaluating whether Activity A Preferred effective-
ly targets activity that would otherwise substitute from Activity 
A (in either System 1 or 2) to Activity B in System 2. If Activity 
A Preferred effectively targets income likely to shift, then the 
lower tax rate on Activity A Preferred would help mitigate the 
efficiency costs and revenue losses that the preference for Activ-
ity B in System 2 generates on the top tax rates in both sys-
tems. If, however, Activity A Preferred does not effectively tar-
get income likely to shift, it will instead increase the tax 
reduction opportunities for income in both systems and worsen 
 
 209. Assuming Activity A and Activity B each produce equal amounts of in-
come under each system prior to the reform, then the average rate under Sys-
tem 1 would be 30% while the average rate under System 2 would be 25%. Af-
ter the introduction of the preference for Activity A Preferred in System 1, the 
average rate in this system would be lower than 30% and closer to the average 
rate in System 2.  
Table 1: Illustration of a Choice in Tax Systems 
 
System 1 System 2 
Activity A 30% 30% 
Activity B 30% 20% 
Reform Option: 
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the efficiency costs and revenue losses resulting from the pref-
erence for Activity B in System 2.  
This example illustrates how a new preference that may 
bring average tax rates across two tax systems closer together 
could either compound or mitigate the effects of an initial pref-
erence. Stated differently, the end result might be something 
closer to average rate neutrality across the systems but a 
greater tax differential between close substitutes, which is 
what matters. Thus, pursuing average tax rate neutrality 
across choice-in-tax systems could violate—rather than fol-
low—the neutrality principle. Policymakers should instead 
evaluate whether a new preference effectively targets income 
that would otherwise shift toward preferenced activity in either 
system.  
C. DOES NEUTRALITY MATTER? 
The analysis so far has expanded on the traditional neu-
trality principle in the public finance literature to explain how 
the introduction of a preference in response to another prefer-
ence might either mitigate or compound the inefficiency costs 
and revenue loss generated by the first preference. As ex-
plained in Part IV, the new business tax preferences in the 
2017 legislation constitute violations of the neutrality principle, 
as it should be properly understood. 
However, this traditional optimal tax analysis does not ful-
ly capture the likely harm that results from mistargeted pref-
erences of this kind. Raising a given amount of revenue at 
greater efficiency cost is less desirable under most views, if 
there is an alternative option to raise the same amount of reve-
nue at a lower efficiency cost. In this case, the efficiency cost is 
simply wasted resources. 
The degree of social concern with these efficiency costs may 
vary, however, depending on who bears these costs. If the addi-
tional efficiency costs are borne only by the wealthiest taxpay-
ers, then these costs may not constitute a significant social wel-
fare loss. In fact, some methods of aggregating social welfare 
would suggest that this doesn’t matter much at all to society at 
large, if taxpayers at the top derive less utility from additional 
resources.210 Frameworks like this would suggest that the 
 
 210. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
  
1550 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1499 
 
wealthiest taxpayers are already significantly under-taxed. 
Raising the same amount of revenue from these taxpayers in a 
less efficient fashion might not be a beneficial policy reform, 
but it would not have a significant negative effect on aggregate 
social welfare.  
As the next Part explains, however, the harm from higher 
efficiency costs from taxing the wealthy could increase if poli-
cymakers face other constraints in increasing the progressivity 
of the tax system to offset revenue loss from poorly targeted 
preferences. Part III connects the optimal tax analysis to an 
analysis grounded in political economy, and the real-world con-
straints on enacting tax policy. This discussion explains how, 
by increasing the efficiency cost of additional revenue, mistar-
geted preferences benefiting the wealthiest taxpayers could 
lead to less revenue collected from the top, resulting in a pro-
gressivity ratchet that constrains the progressive potential of 
the tax system overall.  
III.  THE PROGRESSIVITY RATCHET   
This Part builds upon the basic principles from the public 
finance literature laid out in Part II—and their extension to the 
case of a new preference introduced in response to an initial 
preference. It describes how a violation of the “neutrality prin-
ciple” might lead to the political decision to generate less reve-
nue from the highest income taxpayers, and therefore to accept 
a less progressive income tax system. In this respect, the pro-
gressivity ratchet results from an interaction of the effects of 
tax avoidance and the preferences of lawmakers and their con-
stituents. Specifically, this Part describes three political con-
straints that, in combination with tax preferences allowing 
greater opportunities for tax avoidance, can generate the pro-
gressivity ratchet.  
The progressivity ratchet suggests a harm from prefer-
ences that increase tax avoidance opportunities beyond those 
described in the traditional optimal tax literature. According to 
this literature, preferences that violate the neutrality principle 
will result in lower revenue raised, at a higher efficiency cost, 
from tax increases on other portions of the tax base.211 This 
general harm—which is central in an optimal income tax anal-
 
 211. See supra notes 165–92 and accompanying text. 
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ysis—is not this Article’s central concern. Rather, the concern 
underlying the progressivity ratchet is as follows: if the prefer-
ences creating new opportunities for tax avoidance are main-
tained, policymakers may then choose over time to raise less 
revenue from the highest income taxpayers because of the polit-
ical constraints described in this Part. 
In the absence of these constraints, violating the neutrality 
principle and increasing tax planning might not have this ad-
verse effect on progressivity. Policymakers might simply choose 
to increase tax rates on the highest income taxpayers to offset 
the revenue loss from increased tax avoidance, irrespective of 
the efficiency costs to those taxpayers. The discussion that fol-
lows describes, however, how the progressivity ratchet will 
arise in the presence of the three constraints, and suggests why 
they may be plausible factors resulting in a political choice to 
have a less progressive tax system, with less revenue raised 
from the top and less resources then available to the rest. This 
discussion also explains how the progressivity ratchet can op-
erate in the reverse fashion in the presence of these con-
straints: higher taxes on a portion of the tax base can enable 
more revenue to be raised overall considering the effects on the 
remainder of the tax base.  
A. THE THREE CONSTRAINTS  
1. The Efficiency Cost Constraint 
The first condition, the “efficiency cost constraint,” follows 
directly from the marginal efficiency cost of taxation analysis 
described above. In an optimal tax model, a higher marginal ef-
ficiency cost of taxation implies a lower optimal tax rate on a 
given base, and a lower amount of revenue that should be 
raised and then spent on the uses of tax revenues: public goods, 
services, and redistribution.212 This conclusion results from a 
simple logic: when certain taxes generate higher efficiency costs 
to certain taxpayers, raising these taxes—and thereby funding 
the government programs that they finance213—entails a high-
 
 212. See, e.g., Slemrod, supra note 180, at 776–80 (describing the relation-
ship among the marginal efficiency cost of funds, the elasticity of taxable in-
come, and the optimal amount of redistribution and purchase of public goods). 
 213. Assuming, of course, that the government cannot finance the pro-
grams through other taxes or debt financing on a permanent basis. That is, 
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er price paid in the form of greater efficiency costs. This was 
the dynamic explained in Part II. Thus, a higher marginal effi-
ciency cost suggests policymakers should choose to raise less 
revenue than they would otherwise in order to limit spending 
to areas generating higher social benefits that justify the high-
er cost of raising revenue.  
Policymakers do not strictly operate in an optimal tax 
model. If they did, the tax system would surely look very differ-
ent than it does now, and the business tax preferences would 
not exist in the first place.214 Nonetheless, policymakers may 
still be sensitive to the efficiency loss from raising additional 
revenue in some circumstances. Specifically, they may in some 
ways weigh the amount of harm imposed on certain constitu-
ents—like certain well-to-do constituents—relative to the reve-
nue raised which can be used for public spending and redistri-
bution.  
Returning to the example above,215 it may be that, from a 
policymaker’s perspective, a 1% increase on income from Activi-
ty A is not “worth it” given the efficiency cost resulting from the 
additional revenue raised. The welfare gain from an additional 
$45,000 in public goods, government services, or redistribution 
funded by the tax may not justify the approximately $50,000 to 
$55,000 in efficiency costs imposed on the taxpayers—who may 
object to not just the $45,000 in additional taxes they pay, but 
also the $50,000 to $55,000 in efficiency costs they incur.216  
Policymakers are likely sensitive to the efficiency costs of 
taxation, particularly in the case of high efficiency costs. Effi-
ciency is generally considered a basic principle of tax policy de-
sign,217 and concerns of efficiency may affect policy outcomes 
even when policymakers are not wholly committed to an opti-
 
this simple presentation holds constant the availability to generate revenue 
from other sources.  
 214. See infra Part IV (describing the problems with the new business 
preferences from an optimal tax perspective). 
 215. See supra notes 181–88 and accompanying text.  
 216. That is, from the government’s perspective, the tax raises $45,000 in 
additional revenue, but from the taxpayer’s perspective it imposes up to 
$100,000 of total costs. Of course, these same taxpayers may similarly object 
to a perfectly efficient tax that imposes a cost on them that is exactly equal to 
the amount of revenue raised.  
 217. For a formative articulation of the centrality of efficiency to tax policy 
analysis, see ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG 
TRADEOFF (2015). 
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mal income tax framework.218 Academic research suggests that 
policymakers are also likely to be more responsive to the pref-
erences of the wealthy.219 In this case, policymakers may tend 
to overweight the concerns of wealthy taxpayers who bear effi-
ciency costs from taxation, even if the tax would otherwise be 
warranted because the welfare gains from the revenue raised 
(and spent or redistributed) would justify these efficiency costs 
to the wealthy. In fact, this research suggests a concern that 
policymakers may be overly responsive to these effects at the 
top of the income distribution, and not sensitive enough to the 
benefits that others members of society may receive as a result 
of the additional tax revenue raised.220 
 
 218. Professor James Poterba has argued, for example, that efficiency 
analysis plays an independent role in the political economy of tax policymak-
ing. See James M. Poterba, Public Finance and Public Choice, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 
391, 395 (1998) (arguing that, even in the political arena where outcomes de-
pend on “equating the marginal political costs” of different policies, “efficiency-
based tax policy analyses can provide a crucial input to the policy process by 
identifying aspects of the current or prospective tax code that impose substan-
tial efficiency costs”); cf. Neil. H. Buchanan, The Role of Economics in Tax 
Scholarship, in BEYOND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN UNITED STATES TAX LAW 
11, 22 (David A. Brennan et al., eds., 2013) (arguing that acknowledging the 
limitations of “efficiency analysis” in tax policy “still leaves plenty of room for 
the use of ‘economic tools’ to assess policies”). 
 219. See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE & INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INE-
QUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 70–97 (2012) (describing the in-
creased responsiveness of government policy to the preferences of high income 
members of society); KAY LEHMAN SCHOLZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY 
CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (2012) (describing the correlation between “political voice” and 
policy outputs); Daniel P. Tokaji, Vote Dissociation, 127 YALE. L.J.F. 761, 772 
(2018) (describing academic research finding “that well-financed interest 
groups exercise outsized influence on public policy”).  
 220. A possible alternative to this theory could justify maintaining prefer-
ences that increase the marginal efficiency cost of funds as a way to facilitate 
progressive outcomes. Cf. Stanley L. Winer & Walter Hettich, What Is Missed 
if We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation?, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 
373, 384 (1998) (“In a competitive political system, governments create special 
provisions as a way of taking differing economic and political responses to tax-
ation into account, while economizing on administration costs. This suggests 
that those special provisions that were introduced to make the tax system ad-
ministratively or politically more efficient should be preserved rather than 
eliminated.”). Specifically, it is possible that taxpayers benefitting from the 
preferences are particularly politically powerful subgroup. As a result, elimi-
nating the preferences and including these taxpayers in a base subject to po-
tential tax increases might reduce the chance of such tax increases succeeding, 
even if the tax increases would now be more efficient than they would other-
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In the presence of this constraint, new preferences for 
business income can make higher progressive rates on individ-
ual income more costly from the perspective of policymakers, 
because the new preferences would induce taxpayers to incur 
further costs in order to change their behavior and access pref-
erential treatment.221 The preference for one portion of the tax 
base would thus constrain policymakers’ ability to increase 
marginal rates—and thereby the degree of progressivity—on 
other portions of the tax base.  
2. The Salience of Tax Rates Constraint  
The second condition, “the salience of tax rates constraint,” 
does not depend on a concern by policymakers or their constitu-
ents with the efficiency costs of taxation. This constraint de-
pends instead on policymakers’ sensitivity to the “sticker price” 
of the top marginal rates, whether reflecting their own prefer-
ences or those of their constituents. In this scenario, policy-
makers may be unable to simply increase tax rates on portions 
of the base in order to offset the revenue loss from preferential 
rates and the tax avoidance they generate. 
This constraint is related to the “efficiency cost constraint,” 
because it also describes a scenario where policymakers en-
counter a political cost to raising tax rates. Under the salience 
of tax rate constraint, however, policymakers may be unable to 
raise the rates even if there is little efficiency cost associated 
with a further tax rate increase. Rather, this constraint results 
from the unique political salience of the top statutory tax rates, 
 
wise be with the preference. In this scenario the net efficiency cost to taxpay-
ers subject to tax would be lower, but political difficulty could be greater. Dif-
ferent subgroups of the wealthiest taxpayers may have greater or lesser politi-
cal influence on tax policy, as reflected by the fact that in many cases some 
wealthy taxpayers receive unique tax preferences that others do not. This pos-
sibility does not suggest, however, that the power among the rich is so frag-
mented that an inefficient preference for some subgroup of the wealthy will 
lead to more revenue raised from the rich as a whole, and an overall more pro-
gressive tax system. Policymakers will be faced with the fact that raising that 
revenue entails greater efficiency burden on at least some of the rich. Further, 
policymakers face additional constraints—such as “the salience of tax rates 
constraint” discussed in the following Section—that increase the likelihood 
that such inefficient preferences lead to less overall progressivity, rather than 
more. 
 221. See infra Parts IV.A–B.  
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and the limitations policymakers may face in raising more rev-
enue by increasing these rates. 
Evidence suggests that policymakers may perceive higher 
costs to increasing the progressivity of the tax system by rais-
ing the statutory tax rates, instead of through other changes to 
the tax rules. For example, Professor Deborah Schenk has ar-
gued that policymakers may not be able to raise revenue by in-
creasing top marginal rates directly, because this salient meth-
od of increasing taxes would face greater obstacles from 
interest groups, institutional barriers in Congress, and the 
rhetoric of anti-tax objectors.222 In this case, Professor Schenk 
argues, policymakers may be justified if they instead pursue 
lower-salience taxes as a “second-best” solution.223 
For one example of the “stickiness” of the top marginal tax 
rates, consider the recent history of the top marginal rate on 
individual ordinary income. Before the changes in the 2017 leg-
islation, ordinary income was taxed at top rate of 39.6%, which 
was the highest statutory tax rate on ordinary income in any 
year since 1986.224 Congress first raised the rate to that level in 
the 1993 budget bill.225 In 2001, Congress scheduled the rate to 
phase down to 35%,226 then restored the same 39.6% rate in 
2013,227 and then cut the rate again to the current 37% in the 
2017 tax legislation.228 The 39.6% rate is of course somewhat 
arbitrary and originated in the particular way that the Clinton 
administration framed its 1993 tax rate increase which was no 
 
 222. Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 
28 YALE J. REG. 253, 299–310 (2011). For a review of empirical work on the 
political salience of different forms of taxation, see David Gamage & Darien 
Shanske, Three Essays On Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Sali-
ence, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 33–54 (2011). 
 223. Schenk, supra note 222, at 310 (“[T]here are situations where [low-
salience tax provisions] may enable the government to achieve otherwise wor-
thy goals. So long as the process is reasonably transparent . . . there is no con-
vincing argument that it would be wrong for the government to . . . [use] polit-
ically pleasing taxes or provisions.”). 
 224. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 
§ 13202, 107 Stat. 312. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-16, § 101, 115 Stat. 38, 42. 
 227. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101, 126 
Stat. 2313, 2316 (2013). 
 228. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1, § 11001 (codified at I.R.C. 
§ 199A (2017)).  
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longer relevant in 2013 when this same rate was restored.229 
Nonetheless, the 39.6% rate has continued to be a focal point of 
political discussion over tax reform.230  
Similarly, during an earlier round of tax increases in 1990, 
Congress had to seek other ways to increase progressivity ra-
ther than by simply raising the statutory rate. President 
George H.W. Bush agreed to raise revenues as part of a biparti-
san deficit reduction deal, but, to the degree possible, did not 
want to do so through an explicit statutory rate increase, be-
cause of his campaign pledge not to raise tax rates.231 The solu-
tion was limiting the deductibility of itemized deductions for 
high income taxpayers, which effectively functioned as a mar-
ginal rate increase even if it wasn’t written as such in the 
law.232 The author of the provision in Congress explicitly de-
scribed this solution “as a face-saving way for the President to 
raise taxes without technically raising the tax rates.”233 Of 
course, if Congress had many available ways to continue to 
 
 229. In 1993, President Clinton proposed two new higher ordinary income 
tax brackets—a 36% rate and a 39.6% rate. The 39.6% rate was framed specif-
ically as a 10% surcharge on the highest incomes (10% x 36% + 36% = 39.6%). 
See Ruth Marcus & Ann Devroy, Asking American To ‘Face Facts,’ Clinton 
Presents Plan To Raise Taxes, Cut Deficit, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 1993), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/states/stories/ 
sou021893.htm [https://perma.cc/J5PY-5LD7]. That framing had fallen away 
by 2013. The 2013 law did not even restore the 36% bracket; instead, the sec-
ond highest bracket was 35%. The 39.6% rate had taken on a separate logic of 
its own and the focal point as President Obama sought to repeal elements of 
the tax cuts in the 2000s. 
 230. For example, the infrastructure plan released by Senate Democrats in 
March, 2018 called for restoring the top marginal rate to exactly the same 
39.6% in effect before the 2017 legislation. SENATE DEMOCRATS, JOBS & IN-
FRASTRUCTURE PLAN FOR AMERICA’S WORKERS: RETURNING THE REPUBLICAN 




 231. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Deducting from Deductions of the Wealthier 
Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/23/ 
us/the-budget-battle-deducting-from-deductions-of-the-wealthier-taxpayers 
.html. 
 232. See Schenk, supra note 222, at 277–78 (“[The itemized deduction limi-
tation] is exactly the same as if Congress had raised the rate one percentage 
point. That of course would have been much simpler, but at the time it was 
also politically difficult to do.”).  
 233. Nash, supra note 231. 
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raise rates without explicitly doing so in the tax rate tables, the 
“salience of tax rates” constraint may not significantly con-
strain progressive reforms, but such mechanisms are in limited 
supply. More importantly, the episode from 1990 again helps 
illustrate the particular political salience of statutory tax rates, 
and why policymakers may be more successful in adjusting tax 
burdens through other changes to the tax Code. 
This constraint relates to the progressivity ratchet as fol-
lows. For any chosen top statutory rate on a portion of the tax 
base, preferences on other portions of the tax base that increase 
opportunities for taxpayers to avoid the top marginal rate will 
result in less revenue raised from that top rate. Of course, the 
preference for a portion of the base will reduce revenue, by ex-
plicitly reducing the amount of the base subject to the top rate. 
This effect is magnified, however, as economic activity subject 
to the residual high-tax base shifts to the preferenced base, 
through the process described in Part II above. If policymakers 
cannot compensate by further increasing the top marginal 
rates, because of the salience of this form of tax increases, the 
preferences for a portion of the tax base will constrain overall 
progressivity as rates on the remainder of the base will not rise 
enough to offset the revenue loss from poorly targeted prefer-
ences.  
3. The Revenue-Maximizing Rate Constraint 
The third condition, “the revenue-maximizing rate con-
straint” describes the scenario where policymakers determine 
to tax the wealthy at the revenue maximizing rate—the rate 
where additional rate increases will not generate any more rev-
enue. At that point, policymakers simply cannot raise rates fur-
ther to offset revenue loss from preferences for a portion.234 
In this scenario, the progressive revenue-raising potential 
from this top rate will depend, in part, on whether taxpayers 
have an opportunity to shift from the higher-taxed base to a 
preferenced base. Even in the absence of such tax avoidance, 
the fact that part of the base isn’t fully subject to the tax rate 
 
 234. That is, in the case of the salience of tax rates constraint, policymak-
ers cannot raise the top marginal rate because of the political salience of rate 
increases. In the case of the “revenue-maximizing rate constraint,” policymak-
ers cannot raise the top marginal rate because doing so would not generate 
additional revenue.  
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increase would lower revenue. This effect is then magnified to 
the degree that taxpayers can substitute across the tax bases 
and shift away from the base subject to the higher rates.  
The revenue-maximizing rate on a base varies with the 
amount of tax avoidance generated for any additional rate in-
crease.235 As the avoidance opportunities increase, the revenue-
maximizing rate—and the revenue raised from this maximum 
rate—decreases.  
This constraint would bind policymakers irrespective of 
whether the tax avoidance results in significant efficiency costs. 
Even if the taxpayer can avoid the higher rate at a low cost 
(and thus would even incur these costs at lower top rates), this 
behavior will still result in less revenue raised, and less overall 
progressivity resulting from the revenue maximizing rates. For 
the same reason, the constraint also binds policymakers even if 
they are not concerned with the efficiency costs incurred by the 
taxpayers subject to tax rate increases.236 
According to some views in the literature, policymakers 
may be justified in setting top tax rates at or close to the reve-
nue-maximizing rate. As described above, some scholars have 
argued that efficiency costs at the top of the distribution should 
not translate into social welfare loss, because there may be lit-
tle social value in additional resources for the wealthiest tax-
payers.237 In that case, tax rates should be set at the revenue 
maximizing point, and the only social welfare losses from tax 
avoidance would result from the reduced revenue raised for the 
government and available for redistribution and public spend-
ing.238 
As suggested above, policymakers do not necessarily oper-
ate in an optimal tax model. Irrespective of motive, however, 
policymakers will be bound by “the revenue maximizing rate 
constraint” if they raise rates sufficiently high, and preferences 
 
 235. This follows from the basic principle that the revenue leakage from 
taxation will vary with the elasticity of the base subject to tax. See Saez et al., 
supra note 165, at 8.  
 236. That is, the net result from the policymaker’s perspective would again 
be lower revenue raised at the revenue-maximizing rate, irrespective of 
whether the revenue loss results from large or small efficiency costs incurred 
by the taxpayers.  
 237. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 238. See, e.g., Diamond & Saez, supra note 7, at 168–70. 
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that increase the opportunities for tax avoidance lower the po-
tential ceiling of this revenue-maximizing rate.  
The revenue-maximizing rate constraint is only relevant 
under a much more progressive income tax system with higher 
top margin rates. In the case of ordinary income tax rates, evi-
dence suggests that this revenue-maximizing rate would be 
significantly higher than under current law.239 Economists Pe-
ter Diamond and Emmanuel Saez estimate that this optimal 
revenue-maximizing rate would be approximately 73%.240 This 
revenue-maximizing rate, however, depends on the tax avoid-
ance opportunities available to taxpayers. The 2017 legisla-
tion’s business tax preferences—and the new tax avoidance op-
portunities that they introduced—likely reduced this revenue-
maximizing rate, and therefore the amount of revenue that can 
be raised from the wealthiest taxpayers at this revenue-
maximizing rate.241 This constraint is likely irrelevant for 
smaller tax rate changes based on rates today, but would be 
relevant for larger ones, including such proposals as the one in-
troduced by Representative Ocasio-Cortez.242 
B. PATH DEPENDENCY IN THE TAX SYSTEM 
This discussion does not intend to suggest that political 
outcomes—or constraints—are inevitable. These constraints—
particularly the “efficiency cost constraint” and “the salience of 
tax rates constraint”—are functions of politics, and preferences 
of policymakers and constituents, which can and do change. 
Some policymakers may feel more bound by some of these con-
straints than others. With that said, evidence suggests that 
these constraints do exist in the political process.243 
In the same vein, the business preferences that are the 
subject of this Article are themselves the product of their own 
political forces and constraints, but these business tax prefer-
ences need not be considered inevitable outcomes of the politi-
cal process. After all, they are new to the tax system as of the 
 
 239. Id. at 171. 
 240. Id.  
 241. The 2017 Tax Legislation, supra note 1. 
 242. Stracqualursi, supra note 6; supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra notes 217–20, 222–33, 236–39 and accompanying text.  
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2017 legislation and after passage remained unpopular with a 
significant portion of the electorate.244  
These three constraints ultimately suggest a political path 
dependency—where the introduction of new tax preferences 
can decrease the probability of future progressive tax changes, 
assuming those preferences are maintained. Policymakers 
seeking to increase the progressivity of the tax system—and, 
specifically, the revenue raised from the wealthiest taxpayers—
should seek to “reverse the ratchet” in order to reduce the 
probability that their effort will run aground on these barriers.  
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR TAX REFORM   
This Part considers the implications of the progressivity 
ratchet—and how its effect depends on the particular legal 
rules defining the scope of new tax preferences—for evaluating 
the 2017 tax legislation and the future of progressive tax de-
sign.  
Sections A and B first describe how the progressivity 
ratchet suggests an alternative assessment of the corporate 
rate reduction and Section 199A. As described above, critiques 
of the 2017 tax legislation in the literature have generally fo-
cused on its explicit distributional effects and the design of Sec-
tion 199A.245 At the same time, the corporate rate reduction re-
ceived measured praise as a response to lower rates in foreign 
jurisdictions.246 This Part reconsiders these assessments. In 
short, the corporate rate reduction and the pass-through deduc-
tion can both be understood as similarly mistargeted responses 
to low tax rates elsewhere in the system that were introduced 
in order to improve “neutrality” along specific margins in the 
tax law. Both changes will likely have the similar effect of in-
creasing the efficiency cost of taxation and, because of political 
economy constraints, locking in a less progressive tax system 
over time—if these structures are retained.  
Section C then describes how the progressivity ratchet in 
the 2017 legislation will obstruct future progressive tax re-
forms, such as recent proposals to raise the marginal rates on 
 
 244. Megan Brenan, More Still Disapprove than Approve of 2017 Tax Cuts, 
GALLUP (Oct. 10, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/243611/disapprove 
-approve-2017-tax-cuts.aspx [https://perma.cc/JSH5-URCZ].  
 245. See supra Part I.C.  
 246. See supra Part I.C. 
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ordinary income earned by the wealthiest taxpayers. This anal-
ysis also explains the deeper distributional consequences of the 
changes in the 2017 legislation. Finally, Section D evaluates 
different reform options to “reverse the ratchet,” which would 
in turn facilitate future progressive reforms.  
A. REEVALUATING THE CORPORATE RATE REDUCTION  
Many commentators on the 2017 tax legislation considered 
the corporate rate reduction something of a saving grace in an 
otherwise flawed bill. As described above, proponents argued 
that the corporate rate reduction would improve neutrality in 
the tax system and discourage U.S. MNCs from shifting income 
to low-tax jurisdictions by changing the location of reported 
profits or real economic investment.247 This assessment, how-
ever, focuses narrowly on the corporate system in the interna-
tional context. It fails to take into account the effects on the 
broader tax system—including both the significant opportuni-
ties for domestic tax avoidance that the low corporate rate gen-
erates and the ways in which a low corporate rate is likely to 
constrain the overall progressivity of the tax system due to the 
ratchet effect we describe. 
First, the corporate rate reduction may not be justified un-
der a traditional application of the neutrality rule and the op-
timal tax framework. The domestic and foreign profits of MNCs 
turn out not to be close substitutes, even after the corporate 
rate reduction. This might come as a surprise. After all, MNCs 
do shift large amounts of profits to foreign jurisdictions from 
the United States.248 Kimberly Clausing estimates that in 2015 
U.S. MNCs shifted approximately $309 to $379 billion in prof-
its from the United States to lower-taxed foreign jurisdic-
tions.249 The corporate rate cut, however, may not meaningfully 
reduce profit shifting. For instance, Clausing estimates that 
cutting the U.S. corporate rate to 21% would only reduce the 
amount of shifted profits by $50 billion (resulting in a net reve-
nue gain of only about $11 billion).250 The Congressional Budg-
 
 247. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 248. See Kimberly Clausing, Profit Shifting Before and After the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act 12–13 (Jan. 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3274827 [https://perma.cc/2J3V-93KM]. 
 249. Id. at 13.  
 250. Id. at 30.  
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et Office similarly estimates that the 2017 legislation as a 
whole, including base protection measures and behavioral 
changes of foreign corporations, would reduce profit shifting out 
of the United States by only about $65 billion per year on aver-
age over the next eleven years—with the corporate rate cut re-
sponsible for only some portion of that amount.251 One leading 
analyst of international capital flows finds, based on early post-
2017 data, that the corporate rate reduction might have had 
virtually no effect on profit shifting.252  
The reason for this modest expected reduction in profit 
shifting is that most MNCs shift profits to very low-tax coun-
tries. As a result, even with the lower U.S. corporate rate, these 
companies may still benefit from reporting profits abroad.253 
Thus, an even larger corporate rate reduction (entailing an 
even greater net revenue loss and ratchet effect across the rest 
of the tax system) would be necessary to induce MNCs to report 
these mobile profits in the United States. At the rates intro-
duced in the 2017 tax legislation, however, taxpayers may still 
benefit by shifting profits to foreign jurisdictions.  
The corporate rate reduction also may not have a signifi-
cant effect in discouraging investment abroad and encouraging 
investment in the United States, because the location of real 
 
 251. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2018 
TO 2028, at 124 (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53651 [https://perma 
.cc/R8KY-WN4X].  
 252. See Brad Setser, Opinion, The Global Con Hidden in Trump’s Tax Re-
form Law, Revealed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
02/06/opinion/business-economics/trump-tax-reform-state-of-the-union-2019 
.html [https://perma.cc/KM6Z-6RWB] (“The global distribution of corporations’ 
offshore profits—our best measure of their tax avoidance gymnastics—hasn’t 
budged from the prevailing trend.”). 
 253. Clausing, supra note 248, at 29 (describing a limited effect of the cor-
porate rate reduction on profit shifting “since most profit shifting occurs with 
respect to the lowest taxed countries, and 21 percent is still well above that 
threshold”); Setser, supra note 252 (“Why would any multinational corporation 
pay America’s 21 percent tax rate when it could pay the new ‘global minimum’ 
rate of 10.5 percent on profits shifted to tax havens, particularly when there 
are few restrictions on how money can be moved around a company and its 
foreign subsidiaries?”); see also, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 251, 
at 125 (“Because tax havens outside the United States will continue to have 
relatively low tax rates, CBO projects that most IP currently located there will 
remain there. For newly created or future IP, the changes resulting from the 
tax act and the fixed costs of transferring IP to foreign affiliates will probably 
deter some small amount of profit shifting.”). 
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investment by MNCs may not be particularly sensitive to tax 
changes.254 In other words, this evidence suggests that domes-
tic and foreign real investments by MNCs are also not close 
substitutes. This phenomenon in part explains why, when 
evaluating the 2017 legislation as a whole, the Congressional 
Budget Office finds that by the tenth year after the changes, 
when the corporate rate cut is the only significant tax cut still 
in place, Gross National Product—the value of production at-
tributable to U.S. nationals—would increase by merely 0.1%.255 
Policymakers also have other options to encourage domestic in-
vestments that are likely to more directly incentivize invest-
ment at a lower revenue loss than through a broad corporate 
rate reduction, and without introducing downward pressure on 
tax rates in other parts of the system. One example of such a 
policy is expensing of new capital investments.256  
 
 254. See Kimberly A. Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 
TAX L. REV. 433, 455 (2012) (concluding based on a cross-sectional study of 
countries and corporate tax rates that “there is no evidence that lower tax 
countries experience greater growth (or lesser declines) in gross fixed capital 
formation relative to GDP”); see also Paul Krugman, Opinion, Tax Cuts and 
Leprechauns (Wonkish), N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/06/15/opinion/tax-cuts-and-leprechauns-wonkish.html [https://perma.cc/ 
L52X-2CX4] (“Multinational corporations move profits—as reported—around 
based on tax considerations; actual capital, and hence actual economic activi-
ty, not so much.”).  
 255. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LETTER TO THE HONORABLE CHRIS VAN 
HOLLEN, RE: EFFECTS OF THE 2017 TAX ACT ON INCOME ACCRUING TO FOR-
EIGN INVESTORS 1 (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress 
-2017-2018/reports/53772-2017taxacteffectsonincome.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
NJT6-SSMN]. This finding reflects a slightly increased capital stock but also 
subtracts out increased payments to foreign investors. Alan Auerbach sug-
gests, however, that the effects on economic welfare in the United States may 
be more significant, if still somewhat modest. See Auerbach, supra note 138, at 
115–16. Auerbach in fact cites CBO results as in part supporting this. Id. In 
part, this is because Auerbach focuses on increases in domestic product, which 
includes the increased income of foreign investors, as opposed to national 
product, which focuses on the incomes of U.S. nationals. In evaluating the 
benefits of a corporate rate cut in a unilateral reform by the United States, 
national product may be the more relevant metric. 
 256. For instance, Jason Furman and Robert Barro estimate that simply 
extending 50% bonus depreciation for equipment might have done more to 
boost output at one-sixth of the cost of the changes in the 2017 legislation. 
Robert J. Barro & Jason Furman, Macroeconomic Effects of the 2017 Tax Re-
form, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2018, at 257, 304. Im-
portantly, Furman and Barro explicitly do not account for the effect of the 
change in relative tax rates between the United States and other countries, 
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The corporate rate cut has likely only modestly reduced 
shifting of profits and investment out of the United States, but 
also preferenced a large additional portion of the corporate in-
come tax base that would not have shifted abroad otherwise. In 
2013, corporations reported approximately $1.3 trillion in net 
taxable income.257 The corporate rate reduction extends this 
benefit of a 14% tax cut across the entire corporate taxable 
base, cutting revenues by almost $150 billion per year.258 For 
the reasons described in the abstract presentation above,259 a 
properly targeted rate reduction on the smaller tranche of MNC 
income that was in fact subject to profits shifting or shifting of 
investment locale within that rate range would have properly 
applied the neutrality principle, and thereby could have low-
ered the marginal efficiency cost of taxation while limiting ad-
ditional revenue loss.260 The broader and mistargeted corporate 
 
and focus only on marginal tax rates in the United States and their effects on 
capital accumulation. They acknowledge that the relative tax rates might mat-
ter for real activity, but conclude the effect of the 2017 legislation on this mar-
gin—after taking into account both the rate cut and other international provi-
sions—is ambiguous. See id. at 296–97 (“The impact of all these changes on 
reported income is less ambiguous and is likely to be positive as reported in-
come is shifted back to the United States. This change would, however, not be 
associated with actual economic activity . . . .”). Others have argued that ex-
pensing may not be the most effective method to encourage new business in-
vestment. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Accounting for Behavioral Considera-
tions in Business Tax Reform: The Case of Expensing (Jan. 25, 2017) (working 
paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2904885 (arguing 
that rate reductions may be more salient and therefore more effective means 
of incentivizing investment).  
 257. JOHN A. KOSKINEN ET AL., REVENUE SERV., 2013 STATISTICS OF IN-
COME: CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 2 (2013), https://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-soi/13coccr.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR7W-MPRC]. 
 258. Of course, the 2017 tax legislation also included some corporate base 
broadening measures, such as the limitation on interest expense deductions 
under I.R.C. § 163(j) (2017), which may be independently justified. This dis-
cussion focuses on the particular effect of the corporate rate cut.  
 259. Supra Part II.B.1.  
 260. For example, a “patent box” regime could achieve this function by lim-
iting the preference to a narrow category of mobile income. See Bernard 
Knight & Goud Maragni, It Is Time for the United States To Implement a Pa-
tent Box Tax Regime To Encourage Domestic Manufacturing, 19 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 39, 47–48 (2013). For a discussion of the potential challenges with 
implementing a patent box regime, including the potential of “downward pres-
sure on international anti-avoidance standards,” see Lilian V. Faulhaber, The 
Luxembourg Effect: Patent Boxes and the Limits of International Cooperation, 
101 MINN. L. REV. 1641, 1645 (2017). Commentators have noted that the FDII 
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rate reduction, however, will generate additional revenue costs 
which Congress will have to make up through tax increases 
elsewhere, while at the same time increasing the marginal effi-
ciency cost from those other taxes.  
Further, as described above, mistargeted preferences have 
the effect of increasing the amount of socially costly and reve-
nue-losing substitution from higher- to lower-taxed activity by 
preferencing a broader range of activities which may then serve 
as substitutes for other activities in the residual higher-taxed 
base.261 In this case, an expansion of the preference for all cor-
porate income can increase the elasticity of taxable income—
and therefore the marginal efficiency cost of higher rates—for 
all non-corporate income that can substitute into the corporate 
system.  
In original analysis conducted for this Article, estimators 
at the Penn-Wharton Budget Model calculate that, absent the 
changes in 2017 legislation, taxpayers with income in excess of 
$500,000 would have earned approximately $530 billion in or-
dinary pass-through income in 2018, and almost all of that 
would have been higher-taxed if it were instead taxed in the 
corporate system.262 With a 21% corporate rate (and absent 
Section 199A), however, roughly 85% of that income tax base, 
or over $450 billion, would now face lower tax rates in the cor-
porate system than in the pass-through system.263 With Section 
199A in place, nearly 40% of this tax base would switch from 
facing lower rates in the pass-through system to lower rates in 
 
regime, described supra note 97 and accompanying text, operates similarly to 
a patent box. See KYLE POMERLEAU, TAX FOUND., A HYBRID APPROACH: THE 
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN PROFITS UNDER THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 13 
(2018), https://taxfoundation.org/treatment-foreign-profits-tax-cuts-jobs-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/J9NX-QWSZ]. Finally, policymakers may be constrained 
from preferencing some forms of mobile corporate income if such rules consti-
tuted export subsidies that violated international trade obligations. See Kamin 
et al., supra note 25, at 1499–1503 (discussing the possibility that the FDII 
regime violates WTO agreements).  
 261. See supra Part II.B.2.  
 262. E-mail from Richard Prisinzano, Senior Economist, Penn Wharton 
Budget Model, to David Kamin, Professor of Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law (Oct. 
5, 2018, 3:56 PM EST) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Oct. 5 Prisinzano E-
mail]; Feb. 13 Ricco E-mail, supra note 28. 
 263. These new estimates from Penn-Wharton assume that each firm dis-
tributes approximately half its annual profits as dividends. Oct. 5 Prisinzano 
E-mail, supra note 262. Of course, the proportion of profits distributed by each 
firm will vary with their unique economic circumstances.  
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the corporate system.264 As a result, the corporate rate reduc-
tion—if it is retained—could result in significant shifting over 
time from the pass-through to the corporate systems.265  
As described above, Congress could have also addressed 
the problem of profit shifting by MNCs in other ways that 
 
 264. Id. 
 265. The amount of shifting from the pass-through to the corporate sys-
tems will depend on the sensitivity of the choice of entity decisions to the tax 
rate differential between the systems. Empirical studies of this question in the 
late 1990s suggested that choice of entity decisions were relatively insensitive 
to the tax rate differential. See, e.g., Austan Goolsbee, Taxes, Organizational 
Form, and the Deadweight Loss of the Corporate Income Tax, 69 J. PUB. ECON. 
143, 150–51 (1998) (“The evidence indicates that taxes played a statistically 
significant role in organizational form decisions from 1900–1939 but the mag-
nitude was quite small.”); Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason & Roger H. Gordon, How 
Much Do Taxes Discourage Incorporation?, 52 J. FIN. 477, 478 (1997) (“The 
measured effects are relatively small . . . .”). However, those findings also in-
cluded the responses of publicly-traded firms—which may be relatively insen-
sitive to the tax rate differential. As a result, these findings are not good 
guides for assessing the sensitivity of current pass-throughs to changes in the 
tax rate differential, since most pass-throughs are closely-held firms. See Ka-
rin Edmark & Roger H. Gordon, The Choice of Organizational Form by Close-
ly-Held Firms in Sweden: Tax Versus Non-Tax Determinants, 22 INDUS. & 
CORP. CHANGE 219, 222 (2013) (“All of these studies, though, use aggregat-
ed . . . data, thereby including widely held firms that have a clear choice of or-
ganizational form as well as closely-held firms where the choice can depend 
much more on particular tax and non-tax factors.”). Subsequent studies fo-
cused on closely-held firms found much greater sensitivity to the tax rate dif-
ferential. See Edmark & Gordon, supra, at 223 (finding large effects of tax 
rates on choice of entity in Sweden among closely-held firms); Austan Gools-
bee, The Impact of the Corporate Income Tax: Evidence from State Organiza-
tional Form Data, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2283, 2284 (2004) (finding sensitivity to 
tax rates in the retail sector—where firms tend to be closely held—between 
five and fifteen or more times greater than in the previous studies). These em-
pirical studies are also limited by the fact that that sensitivity to tax rate dif-
ferentials may also depend on the particular rate environment and choice of 
entity rules at the time. For instance, a further increase in individual income 
tax rates could result in relationships between the systems not reflected in 
these prior studies. See Richard Prisinzano & James Pearce, Tax-Based 
Switching of Business Income 11, 19 (Penn Wharton Budget Model, Working 
Paper No. 2018-2, 2018), http://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2018/3/ 
16/w2018-2 [https://perma.cc/7BGU-HX76]. In light of the possible limitations 
of these earlier findings in the current rate environment, we use data from the 
Penn Wharton Budget Model to help illustrate the magnitude of the pass-
through income that could shift to the corporate system in response to higher 
individual rates, even though the empirical work to date doesn’t provide a def-
inite answer to exactly how much income will shift in response to particular 
rate differentials.  
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would have avoided these structural pressures on the remain-
der of the tax base. The 2017 tax legislation in fact introduced 
base-protection measures meant to target the types of tax 
planning activities that tend to shift profits out of this country, 
and Congress may be able to improve these rules.266  
In sum, Congress opted for a broad-based corporate rate 
reduction, which largely failed to solve the problem of profit 
shifting by MNCs and likely had a relatively muted effect on 
investment. At the same time, the change introduced a new 
preference that increased the efficiency cost of taxation in the 
income tax system and reduced the revenue raised at any given 
rate in the individual income tax. This effect, combined with 
the political economy constraints described above, threatens to 
undermine the overall progressivity of the system and progres-
sive reforms to the individual income tax in particular.  
To describe this dynamic somewhat differently, proponents 
of the large corporate rate reduction have not answered the 
question of how they envision this reform interacting with the 
individual income tax. This omission is troubling within the 
confines of an optimal income tax analysis—since it increases 
the efficiency loss associated with raising revenue. It is even 
more problematic, however, in light of political economy con-
straints and the likelihood that revenue lost to the corporate 
rate cut will not be made up with higher individual rates for 
the reasons described in Part III. A low corporate rate thus 
threatens to put the tax system on a path toward less progres-
sivity overall.  
B. REEVALUATING SECTION 199A  
Our analysis also suggests a somewhat more nuanced as-
sessment of the Section 199A pass-through deduction. As we 
and others have suggested in previous work, the provision is a 
policy mistake.267 Reaching that conclusion, however, requires 
seriously considering the trade-offs in introducing a new pref-
erence in response to an existing preference. Further, the harm 
from Section 199A is ultimately different from—and worse 
than—the harm the previous literature has described. The pro-
gressivity ratchet explains why Section 199A is likely to result 
 
 266. See supra notes 98–99; infra notes 308–13 and accompanying text.  
 267. See supra Part I.C.1. 
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in more than just immediate revenue loss and unnecessary 
complexity, but also a less progressive system over time.  
As described in Part II, it is possible in theory for a new 
preference to reduce harms from a pre-existing preference. In 
this case, Section 199A could be responsive to the preference for 
corporate income (which is itself a poorly targeted preference to 
address international pressures). If Section 199A were in fact 
well-targeted on activity that would otherwise shift to lower 
taxes in the corporate system, then Section 199A could be con-
sistent with the neutrality rule and help mitigate some of the 
political dynamics generating the progressivity ratchet as a re-
sult of the corporate rate reduction.  
In this case, assessing the wisdom of Section 199A re-
quires, first, evaluating the legal rules defining the availability 
of the preference and whether these rules preference activities 
that would otherwise substitute to lower rates in the corporate 
system.268 Section 199A surely mitigated some such substitu-
tion and also avoided preferencing some activities that could 
not have taken advantage of the corporate system. The original 
calculations performed for this Article by analysts at the Penn 
Wharton Budget Model indicate that, as of 2018, approximately 
$200 billion of pass-through profits from taxpayers earning 
over $500,000 wouldn’t face a tax incentive to shift to the cor-
porate system with Section 199A in place, as compared to a tax 
system without it.269 Perhaps more importantly, they estimate 
that many taxpayers in this income range benefiting from Sec-
tion 199A may now pay tax at rates close to what they would 
pay in the corporate system.270 Thus, Section 199A likely dis-
couraged some revenue-losing and costly substitution as a re-
sult.  
Some of the legal rules limiting access to Section 199A will 
in fact exclude taxpayers who could not easily substitute to the 
corporate system. For instance, employees—who do not qualify 
 
 268. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 269. See Oct. 5 Prisinzano E-mail, supra note 262. 
 270. See Prisinzano & Pearce, supra note 265, at 20. Specifically, the pass-
through profits of taxpayers benefiting from Section 199A and earning more 
than $500,000 would, on average, face a tax rate only about 1% lower than 
profits of these taxpayers earned in the corporate system, assuming the corpo-
ration distributed an average proportion of its earnings. Authors’ calculations 
based on the Penn Wharton Budget Model. Id. 
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for Section 199A271—could also not readily take advantage of 
corporate form and avoid the second layer of tax in that system, 
since personal holding company and retained earnings rules 
would be significant barriers for them.272 Section 199A’s re-
quirement that firms owned by high-income individuals must 
have employee wages, tangible investments, or a combination 
thereof273 might also be seen as excluding from the Section 
199A benefit firms that would have trouble justifying retaining 
earnings in the corporate system.274 
In other cases, however, Section 199A replicated the corpo-
rate rate reduction’s mistake of failing to properly target mobile 
MNC income, and preferenced a sector of the tax base that 
could not have otherwise benefitted from the corporate rate re-
duction. This consequence may be inevitable, to a degree, in the 
case of any pass-through preference, regardless of how it is de-
signed. Congress cannot easily design rules that target taxpay-
ers and activities which would otherwise substitute into lower 
tax rates in a different tax system without simply replicating 
the exact same system—and, thus, the exact same substitution 
that Congress is attempting to mitigate. For instance, service-
oriented partnerships might have trouble restructuring their 
profit-sharing arrangements within a corporate structure be-
cause partners may be rewarded different shares of profits each 
year depending on their productivity275—and yet such partner-
 
 271. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 274. Specifically, firms without significant numbers of employees or tangi-
ble investments would likely have a harder time on average than other firms 
avoiding the accumulated earnings tax if profits are retained. For a brief de-
scription of the tax, see supra note 68 and accompanying text. Without opera-
tions involving investment in human or physical capital in the firm, companies 
might not be able to justify retaining a substantial share of profits for “reason-
able needs” of the business.  
 275. These service businesses would first encounter the personal holding 
company rules and the surtax that could apply to income retained from “per-
sonal service contracts.” See supra note 67 and accompanying text. These rules 
can be avoided, however, if the firm has enough owners or the contracts do not 
specify which individuals will provide the services. See supra note 70. The 
more challenging issue might be awarding different amounts of compensation 
to owners depending on their service but still having those profits character-
ized as corporate profits retained in the firm. The risk, from the perspective of 
the owners, is that—because of the variation in value (with potentially differ-
ent amounts of stock awarded a given year based on the services performed in 
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ships are not wholly barred from accessing the deduction. In-
stead, Section 199A draws arbitrary distinctions between pro-
fessional services that receive the deduction and those that do 
not, which do not seem to correlate with any distinction be-
tween firms that would otherwise shift to the corporate system 
and those that would not.276 Section 199A’s mistargeting leads 
to windfall gains to many taxpayers who qualify for Section 
199A but who would not have substituted to the corporate sys-
tem and also new opportunities for other taxpayers to plan 
their way into Section 199A and avoid the top individual 
rates.277  
This framework suggests a basic trade-off when assessing 
Section 199A: the potential benefit of preventing some taxpay-
ers from shifting into the corporate system versus the potential 
costs of granting windfall gains to some taxpayers and intro-
ducing additional tax planning opportunities for others. Given 
the heterogeneity in tax planning opportunities in the corpo-
rate and pass-through systems, the mistargeting effects of Sec-
tion 199A seems likely to predominate, though the question is 
an empirical one.  
Further, this framework also shows that the relevant ques-
tion is not whether Section 199A will, on average, tax eligible 
entities at similar tax rates as corporations. “Average rate neu-
trality” between systems should not be the goal. Rather, the 
goal should be treating close substitutes more neutrally, and 
Section 199A—by preferencing activities that would not other-
wise shift into the corporate system and creating new dispari-
ties within the individual income tax system—fails to do that.  
In the end, the greatest potential harm of Section 199A—
like the corporate rate cut—may not be the immediate revenue 
loss or additional complexity. Rather, the even greater harm 
might be from the way in which it constrains policymakers 
from raising revenue from the highest income taxpayers 
through future reforms. If corporations and pass-through enti-
ties retain their current mistargeted preferences, these prefer-
 
that year)—this award may be characterized as either a disproportionate dis-
tribution (and therefore as a dividend) under I.R.C. §§ 301, 305(b)(2) (2017) or 
as employee compensation under I.R.C. § 83 (2017).  
 276. See supra notes 93, 110–15 and accompanying text. For example, 
there is no clear reason why architects or engineers may be more likely to ben-
efit from the corporate system than lawyers and doctors.  
 277. See supra notes 110–15 and accompanying text. 
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ences will serves as barriers to higher rates on the rest of the 
tax base. 
C. THE CHALLENGE TO PROGRESSIVE TAXATION  
The progressivity ratchet also explains the relationship be-
tween the changes in the 2017 legislation and proposals to in-
crease the progressivity of the tax system by raising the top 
rates on high income taxpayers. 
The federal government faces significant additional financ-
ing needs. The CBO finds that the government will need to ei-
ther raise revenue or cut spending by approximately 2% of GDP 
starting in 2019 (around $400 billion) just to stabilize the debt 
at its current share of GDP over the next three decades.278 That 
figure would approximately double if temporary current poli-
cies like the expiring tax cuts and relief from the spending se-
quester are continued.279 Congress may also require additional 
funding to fund critical new public investments. For example, 
as described above, Representative Ocasio-Cortez proposed a 
tax rate increase 70% to specifically raise revenue for responses 
to climate change.280 Finally, a more progressive tax system 
may be necessary to address economic inequality and its at-
tendant social and political harms.281 
Raising top tax rates can help address these policy chal-
lenges, but the progressivity ratchet undermines the effective-
ness of this response and the likelihood that policymakers 
would choose to raise as much as they would otherwise from 
the highest income taxpayers. Because of the progressivity 
ratchet, the structure of the 2017 tax legislation will obstruct 
 
 278. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2018 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 5 
(2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=2018-06/53919-2018ltbo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L4UD-WUSP]. 
 279. The CBO projects that continuing these temporary current policies 
would add about 2% of GDP to the deficit by 2028. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2019 TO 2029, at 107 fig.5-2 (2019), 
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-03/54918-Outlook-3.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/QP89-ZS7L] (showing deficits under the “alternative fiscal scenario”). 
 280. Stracqualursi, supra note 6.  
 281. See, e.g., Income Inequality, OECD, https://data.oecd.org/inequality/ 
income-inequality.htm [https://perma.cc/ZA8R-RPPN] (comparing inequality 
across countries after taxes and transfers and finding that the United States 
has among the highest levels of inequality in the OECD and the highest 
among the G-7 countries); see also Saez & Zucman, supra note 8; supra note 8 
and accompanying text.  
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efforts to increase the revenue raised by the highest income 
taxpayers through future progressive reforms. Whether future 
rate increases finance current commitments, new ones, or cur-
tail economic inequality, the progressivity ratchet will under-
mine all of these goals and reduce the revenue raising efforts 
while increasing the efficiency costs from these increases.  
Consider once again the three possible constraints policy-
makers may face on raising taxes on the wealthy. Because of 
the progressivity ratchet, further tax increases in the individu-
al income tax will entail greater efficiency costs, which may 
constrain policymakers from raising rates if they face the “effi-
ciency cost constraint.” Similarly, the progressivity ratchet will 
result in lower revenue raised at any chosen rate in the indi-
vidual income tax, whether that rate is the revenue-
maximizing rate, in the case of the “revenue-maximizing rate 
constraint” or some lower rate determined by the political pro-
cess, in the case of the “salience of tax rate constraint.” In fact, 
if these constraints are particularly confining, the progressivity 
ratchet could lead to future regressive tax cuts or cuts to gov-
ernment programs.282  
Proposals by Representative Ocasio-Cortez and by econo-
mists for higher marginal rates on the wealthy illustrate the 
challenge of the progressivity ratchet. Substantially increasing 
the top tax rate will raise more revenue from the wealthy at 
lower efficiency costs if taxpayers cannot easily shift their ac-
tivities to preferenced portions of the tax base. While some 
commentators have already highlighted how these higher tax 
rates may not raise revenue if activity shifts over to the corpo-
rate sector,283 the emerging conversation on progressive tax re-
forms has largely ignored how preferences for business income 
may obstruct progressive reforms.284 For example, Diamond 
 
 282. For example, the efficiency costs of higher taxes on the wealthy will 
increase in the presence of the progressivity ratchet, and politicians may be 
sensitive to imposing these costs.  
 283. For instance, analysts at the Penn-Wharton Budget Model explicitly 
considered the potential significance of taxpayers shifting to the corporate sys-
tem in response to higher individual rates and found large potential shifting 
responses. See John Ricco & Rich Prisinzano, The Hidden Revenue Cost of a 
70% Top Marginal Rate, PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL: ECON. MATTERS 
(Jan. 24, 2019), http://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2019/1/24/the 
-hidden-revenue-cost-of-a-70-top-marginal-rate [https://perma.cc/K5GJ-32X6]. 
 284. Some analysis entirely ignored the ways high income taxpayers could 
avoid the tax increase, including by taking greater advantage of the business 
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and Saez’s estimates of the optimal top rate depend upon a par-
ticular legal framework, which likely does not account for the 
types of tax reduction opportunities introduced by the 2017 tax 
legislation.285  
The progressivity ratchet could significantly limit the rev-
enue raised by higher rates on ordinary income. Before consid-
ering the effects of the 2017 tax legislation, taxpayers with in-
come above $500,000 were projected to earn approximately $1.5 
 
preferences. See Jeff Stein, Ocasio-Cortez Wants Higher Taxes on Very Rich 
Americans. Here’s How Much Money That Could Raise, WASH. POST: 
WONKBLOG (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/ 
01/05/ocasio-cortez-wants-higher-taxes-very-rich-americans-heres-how-much 
-money-could-that-raise/?utm_term=.82b45331b81e (overlooking corporate tax 
rates as a method of avoiding increased marginal income rates). Other analy-
sis did incorporate such avoidance behavior but adopted the same assumptions 
used before the 2017 legislation and without seriously considering the ways in 
which the combination of a low corporate tax rate and the pass-through deduc-
tion might render the earlier assumptions were inapplicable. See Kyle Pomer-
leau & Huaqun Li, How Much Revenue Would a 70% Top Tax Rate Raise? An 
Initial Analysis, TAX FOUND.: TAX POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 14, 2019), https:// 
taxfoundation.org/70-percent-tax-analysis/#_ftnref4 [https://perma.cc/TGW6 
-EHY9]; Ricco & Prisinzano, supra note 283. 
 285. Diamond and Saez recognize that the revenue-maximizing rate de-
pends on the relevant legal rules. The key variable in their estimate is the 
elasticity of taxable income—the sensitivity of the tax base to changes in the 
tax rate. See supra Part II.A.1 for further description of this term. There are a 
range of possible estimates for that parameter, and Diamond and Saez in fact 
calculate a different revenue-maximizing rate of 54% based on an alternative 
estimate of the elasticity. They point to changes in the legal framework as po-
tentially explaining some of the variance in elasticity estimates, writing: “the 
tax avoidance or evasion component of the elasticity . . . is not an immutable 
parameter and can be reduced through base broadening and tax enforcement.” 
Diamond & Saez, supra note 7, at 173. As this Article details, the new prefer-
ences for corporate and pass-through income are likely to result in significant-
ly higher elasticities in the individual income tax system. Substitution be-
tween the individual and corporate systems is not new, but, as described in 
Parts IV.A–B, the 2017 law likely substantially increased the volume of in-
come that would shift away from income tax rate increases using the business 
preferences. In fact, some of the highest estimates of the elasticity of taxable 
income are associated with tax rate changes that, because of the specific legal 
frameworks and rates involved, led to substantial shifts in business form. See, 
e.g, Emmanuel Saez et al., The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to 
Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 3, 21 tbl.1, 33–34 
(2012) (finding high elasticity of taxable income for the top 1% after individual 
income tax rate cuts in 1981 and 1986 and noting that a substantial share of 
the effect in 1986 appeared to be a shift from corporations to pass throughs, 
and especially to S corporations). 
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trillion of ordinary income in 2018.286 Without taking into ac-
count any behavioral responses, a 1% increase in the tax rate 
on this income would generate approximately $15 billion of ad-
ditional revenue per year. According to original analysis con-
ducted for this Article by the Penn-Wharton Budget Model, 
however, roughly one-third of that ordinary income is in the 
form of pass-through profits that were previously tax-
advantaged in the pass-through system, and could now shift to 
the corporate system in the case of a sufficient rate differential 
between two systems.287 If Congress only increases rates in the 
individual income tax—and creates a sufficiently high rate dif-
ferential with the corporate system—much of that pass-through 
business income as well as other forms of individual income 
could shift to the corporate system, meaning that one-third or 
more of that $15 billion per year of potential revenue gain could 
dissipate.288 In effect, raising the ordinary income rate without 
breaking the progressivity ratchet would leave a diminished re-
sidual base of non-business income that, for one reason or an-
other, cannot shift away from this higher rate. Because of the 
dynamics described in Part III, it seems unlikely that policy-
makers would be willing to raise rates enough on the residual 
 
 286. Authors’ estimate based on calculations in Feb. 13 Ricco E-mail, supra 
note 28, and Oct. 5 Prisinzano E-mail, supra note 262. 
 287. Feb. 13 Ricco E-mail, supra note 28. 
 288. One-third may in fact be a low estimate, as a large enough differential 
between the individual and corporate rate would probably entail further reve-
nue leakage to the corporate system. Specifically, wage income could potential-
ly also shift from the individual income to corporate system, and these esti-
mates did not account for this possible leakage. As described above, the 
corporate anti-abuse rules largely prevent most employees from forming cor-
porations and retaining earnings to avoid the second layer of corporate tax. 
See supra note 69. However, if individual income tax rates rise and the corpo-
rate rate or dividend rates do not increase commensurately, this dynamic 
could create a unique opportunity in the history of the tax rules for taxpayers 
to earn income through a corporation, immediately receive a distribution of 
the income and pay the second layer of tax, and still achieve significant tax 
savings. The “reasonable compensation” requirement could limit shareholder-
employees in a corporation from taking advantage of this strategy, but tax-
payers have successfully avoided the application of this doctrine in eras with 
far less potential tax savings at stake. See U.S. GOVT. ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH S CORPORATION 
TAX RULES 26–29 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10195.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3C3N-952K] (describing the substantial difficulty that the IRS has 
had in enforcing the “reasonable compensation” doctrine). 
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non-preferenced base to make up for the income that has shift-
ed to the preferentially taxed bases. 
D. REVERSING THE RATCHET  
The progressivity ratchet explains why the corporate rate 
reduction should be understood as a core structural failing of 
the 2017 tax legislation and an obstacle to future progressive 
reforms. This Section describes and compares different options 
to “break the ratchet”289 and facilitate future rate increases. It 
also situates different reform proposals in the prior literature 
within this Article’s framework.  
1. Restoring the Relative Corporate Penalty 
Congress could break the ratchet by unwinding the struc-
tural changes in the 2017 legislation and restoring the prior 
status quo of a relative corporate penalty for most taxpayers.290 
In this case, Congress could also eliminate Section 199A at a 
lower social cost, because fewer pass-through businesses would 
otherwise shift into the corporate system. As suggested above, 
it is desirable for Congress to eliminate Section 199A even if it 
preserves the low corporate rate, but this change could induce 
revenue loss and efficiency costs from taxpayers shifting into 
the corporate system.291 If Congress raised the corporate rate 
 
 289. Of course, Congress can also break the ratchet through a combination 
of these options. The discussion that follows isolates the different factors in 
order to illustrate and assess the full range of options available to Congress.  
 290. In this case, a relative “corporate penalty” refers to the case of a high-
er effective tax on corporate income than on income earned through a pass-
through for most taxpayers. Under prior law, even those taxpayers able to en-
tirely eliminate the second individual layer of tax on income earned through a 
corporation still faced a top corporate rate that was within the range of top 
rate on income earned directly. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
Restoring the corporate penalty would require increasing the corporate rate to 
the same range as the top individual rate of approximately 40.8%. In this case, 
most taxpayers have relatively little to gain from earning income through a 
corporation rather than directly, under even the most favorable circumstances. 
Of course, any particular taxpayers or firms will face different effective rates 
in the corporate system, depending on such factors as how regularly the firm 
distributes earnings.  
 291. See supra Part IV.B. 
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sufficiently, however, Section 199A would become entirely un-
necessary.292  
Thus far, policymakers and commentators have not gener-
ally embraced restoring the relative corporate penalty from pri-
or law, even among those supporting a more modest corporate 
tax rate increase.293 However, the prior world of a relative cor-
porate penalty offered critical advantages over the post-2017 
framework. First, for closely-held firms, the corporate system 
with a relative penalty was largely irrelevant. These closely-
held firms would, for the most part, not “check the box” to shift 
from the pass-through to the corporate system, even if Con-
gress then raised the individual rates. These firms could oth-
erwise shift with relative ease across this margin,294 and a rela-
tive corporate penalty which induces them to shift into the 
pass-through system would therefore have the effect of treating 
close substitutes neutrally.  
This scenario would largely reserve the corporate system 
for publicly-traded companies that cannot shift to the lower 
rates in the pass-through system without losing access to the 
public equity markets. The empirical literature indicates—
although the question warrants additional study—that firms 
may not be all that sensitive along this margin.295 As a result, 
 
 292. That is, in this case Congress would not have any reason to preference 
pass-through income, since taxpayers would not have the option of better 
treatment under the corporate system.  
 293. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 23, at 320 (“Both before and after the leg-
islation, Democrats urged a corporate tax rate of 25% to 28%.”); Jason Fur-
man, Opinion, Repeal and Replace the Trump Tax Cuts, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/repeal-and-replace-the-trump-tax-cuts 
-1516925433?mod=article_inline (calling for a corporate rate of 25% to 28% 
but full elimination of the pass-through deduction); Paul M. Krawzak, House 
Democrats’ Budget To Assume Corporate Tax Increase, ROLL CALL (Jan. 7, 
2019), http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/house-democrats-budget-to 
-assume-corporate-tax-increase [https://perma.cc/9MYT-SPUG] (reporting that 
the Democratic House budget resolution would assume a corporate rate of be-
tween 25% and 28%). 
 294. See supra note 265. 
 295. See supra note 265 for a discussion of this empirical evidence. See also 
SHAVIRO, supra note 22, at 32 (“Corporate tax status may . . . be hard to avoid 
when prospective investors would value the advantage of access to public capi-
tal markets.”); Emily Cauble, Taxing Publicly Traded Entities, 6 COLUM. J. 
TAX L. 147, 162–64 (2015) (“Because equity holders have strong non-tax rea-
sons to demand liquidity, entities cannot easily abandon public trading in or-
der to avoid corporate tax treatment.”). 
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closely-held and publicly-traded companies may not be close 
substitutes.296 Of course, any substitution across this margin—
by companies electing to be closely-held rather than publicly-
traded—would entail some revenue loss and social cost.297 
Those efficiency costs would include non-tax costs to the busi-
ness of financing privately rather than through public equity 
markets, and any additional costs to society of less transparen-
cy in the business sector. Considering that there does not ap-
pear to be much substitution along this margin, those costs 
may be more desirable, however, than the alternative of allow-
ing all privately-held companies to engage in tax-motivated 
planning across the corporate and pass-through systems. 
Raising the corporate rate would also increase pressure on 
the international margin, which motivated the corporate rate 
cut in the 2017 legislation in the first case.298 As described 
above, however, taxpayers may not be induced to shift profits 
and real investment to the U.S. even after the corporate rate 
cut, at least within the range of relative tax rates introduced in 
the 2017 legislation.299 The potential cost of any shifting along 
the international margin, however, may be desirable in order to 
treat other close substitutes—privately-held firms in the corpo-
rate and pass-through systems—more neutrally in the tax sys-
tem. Further, as described below, the corporate penalty could 
be combined with other rules more effectively targeted on mo-
bile income, in order to raise revenue while still reducing tax-
motivated shifting of profits and investment.300 
In addition to likely treating close substitutes more neu-
trally, the solution of a relative corporate penalty for publicly-
traded companies offers the additional benefit of reserving the 
corporate system for companies which can take advantage of its 
administrative benefits. Scholars justify the corporate system 
on the grounds that entity-level taxation is administratively 
superior for the largest firms with regularly traded interests.301 
A relative corporate penalty required for publicly-traded com-
 
 296. See Cauble, supra note 295, at 163. 
 297. See SHAVIRO, supra note 22, at 33 (“[I]f the tax system penalizes use of 
the corporate form, businesses may end up being discouraged from going pub-
lic . . . .”).  
 298. See Graetz, supra note 23, at 326–27. 
 299. See supra notes 249–57 and accompanying text. 
 300. See infra note 312 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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panies would align the corporate system with this rationale, 
while also mitigating the ratchet and limiting the systemic con-
sequences for the rest of the tax system.  
2. Rule-Based Solutions 
Restoring the corporate penalty would mitigate the ratchet 
by effectively reserving the corporate system for publicly-traded 
companies, and preventing substantial substitution into the 
corporate system as individual income tax rates rise. Congress 
could also attempt to break the ratchet without restoring the 
relative corporate penalty by instead changing the rules gov-
erning the business tax system, through different reform op-
tions proposed in the prior literature.  
These rule-based solutions may be divided into two broad 
categories. First, “targeting” rules would maintain preferences 
for corporate or pass-through income but seek to more accu-
rately target these preferences to income that would in fact 
otherwise shift to other preferences. Alternatively, “neutrality” 
rules would instead eliminate or reduce preferences in the tax 
law, and consequently apply similar tax rates to foreign and 
domestic income as well as corporate and pass-through income 
earned by individual taxpayers and firms.  
Targeting rules. Targeting rules would change the legal cri-
teria governing which taxpayers can access preferential rates 
in the corporate or pass-through systems. Some of these chang-
es would fall under what are often termed “anti-abuse” rules. 
For example, Congress might still offer preferential tax rates in 
the corporate system but limit access to these preferences. 
Congress might attempt to strengthen the rules limiting how 
much earnings can be retained (although there are not obvious 
ways to do so)302 or restore the rules limiting corporate tax ben-
efits for personal service corporations.303 Similarly, Congress 
 
 302. See Glogower, supra note 55, at 965 (describing the challenge in 
strengthening the accumulated earnings tax rules without penalizing business 
with “a legitimate interest in retaining corporate earnings”).  
 303. For example, Professor Shaviro has called for reinvigorating the per-
sonal service corporation regime as a way of mitigating the effects of a lower 
corporate rate. Shaviro, supra note 25, at 54 (“Had Congress continued to ob-
ject, as it traditionally had, to use of the lower corporate rate to make corpora-
tions a convenient tax shelter for non-employee high-earners, it could easily 
have used the [personal service corporation] rules to address this issue.”). 
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could attempt to preserve the Section 199A preference but im-
prove the rules limiting qualification for the deduction.304  
Other targeting rule changes could explicitly limit access to 
the corporate system. For example, scholars have proposed lim-
iting the choice of entity through strict qualification rules tax-
ing all closely-held corporations under the pass-through system 
and reserving the corporate form for publicly-traded entities.305 
This solution would, like the restoration of the corporate penal-
ty, make it substantially harder for closely-held firms to access 
the corporate system to achieve tax savings. At the same time, 
this change would prevent publicly-traded companies from ac-
cessing tax reduction opportunities in the pass-through system. 
This solution would prevent firms from shifting between sys-
tems and therefore mitigate the progressivity ratchet effect re-
sulting from different tax avoidance opportunities across two 
tax systems. 
Targeting rules of this variety, if feasible, could improve 
the current structure introduced by the 2017 tax legislation 
and help narrow mistargeted preferences, but may ultimately 
be less desirable than the alternative option of restoring the 
relative corporate penalty. On the one hand, these targeting 
rules could limit the scope of these preferences and could more 
accurately target these preferences on the activities subject to 
substitution into other preferences, such as shifting profits and 
investment abroad. On the other hand, the targeting may still 
preserve the preference for a significant tranche of income that 
would not otherwise substitute toward another preference.  
For instance, consider a targeting rule limiting corporate 
status to publicly-traded firms. This rule could eliminate the 
revenue losing substitution of closely-held firms to the corpo-
rate sector. Such a rule, however, would not change the fact 
that foreign profits and investment are not close substitutes for 
U.S. profits and investment at current rates, and that the rate 
cut extends to a large domestic corporate tax base. As a result, 
many corporations could still enjoy a significant windfall, which 
would necessitate higher rates elsewhere in the system (or 
 
 304. See generally GREENBERG & KAEDING, supra note 23. 
 305. See, e.g., Toder, Require Firms To Be Taxed as Pass-Throughs, supra 
note 143 (proposal limiting the corporate system to publicly-traded compa-
nies). These rules would have a different effect, however, as part of a corporate 
integration reform. See infra note 313 and accompanying text.  
  
1580 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1499 
 
spending cuts) without significantly discouraging the shifting of 
profits and investment. Targeting rules improving Section 
199A would encounter a similar challenge in identifying pass-
through taxpayers that are most likely to substitute toward 
corporate form, and there are no obvious ways to narrowly tar-
get them. 
Alternatively, Congress could introduce targeting rules 
that explicitly preference a narrow scope of activities—such as 
rules that explicitly preference profits considered attributable 
to mobile intellectual property.306 In this case, Congress would 
improve the targeting by isolating and preferencing the partic-
ular activities subject to substitution, rather than by broadly 
preferencing all corporate income and then attempting to in-
troduce rules limiting the availability of the preference.307  
In the end, the utility of targeting rules will depend on 
whether the improved targeting justifies the remaining prefer-
ences for corporate and pass-through income, and therefore 
more effectively applies the neutrality principle. In many cases 
targeting rules may be insufficient and would leave in place 
mistargeted preferences that still fail to treat close substitutes 
more neutrally, at least as compared to reverting to a relative 
corporate rate penalty. At the same time, many of these target-
ing rules could at least limit the ratchet effect resulting from 
the changes in the 2017 legislation, even if they may not be the 
most desirable option for policymakers.  
Neutrality Rules. Congress could also break the progressiv-
ity ratchet by eliminating the margins that potentially justify 
additional preferences in the tax system. That is, Congress may 
be able to reduce or eliminate an initial preference, instead of 
responding to it by introducing additional preferences. 
Some of these reforms would maintain the basic role of a 
corporate income tax but fundamentally change the treatment 
 
 306. See, for example, Knight & Maragni, supra note 260 (describing the 
possibility of using a “patent box”), for certain features of the 2017 legislation 
designed to address the taxation of mobile corporate profits.  
 307. That is, even a broad preference that is subsequently narrowed 
through eligibility rules could still unnecessarily preference a large portion of 
the tax base. Narrowing the preference also may fail to effectively target the 
remaining preference to activities that would otherwise shift to another pref-
erenced based, and could disallow the preference for activities that are in fact 
susceptible to shifting.  
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of foreign income in that system.308 For example, the 2017 tax 
legislation implemented some of these reforms through the 
GILTI and BEAT rules which, respectively, imposed a global 
minimum tax on foreign income and sought to address profit 
shifting out of the United States by both U.S. and foreign 
firms.309 Congress could retain, and possibly improve these 
rules,310 to limit the incentive for global profit shifting. These 
rules would treat MNC profits reported domestically and 
abroad more neutrally, and if successful, could then allow for a 
higher rate on other corporate income and on individual in-
come.311 These measures could also be combined with a relative 
corporate tax penalty, to both reduce substitution across the in-
ternational margin and between the domestic pass-through and 
corporate systems.312  
Other “neutrality rule” changes would fundamentally re-
form the corporate system and shift the economic locus of taxa-
tion from the corporation to individual shareholders through 
different methods of corporate integration.313 These proposals 
 
 308. Prior works on corporate income tax reform have similarly suggested 
that preferencing certain forms of mobile corporate income could allow for 
higher rates—while minimizing efficiency costs—on the remainder of the cor-
porate tax base. See, e.g., SIR JAMES MIRRLEES ET AL., TAX BY DESIGN: THE 
MIRRLEES REVIEW 440 (2011) (suggesting the efficiency benefits from taxing 
highly mobile corporate rents at lower rates than location specific rents); Mi-
chael Keen, Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful, 
54(4) NAT’L TAX J. 757, 757 (2001) (arguing that preferential tax regimes can 
enable countries “to confine their most aggressive tax competition to particu-
lar parts of the tax system”).  
 309. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.  
 310. See, e.g., Kamin et al., supra note 25, at 1496–97 (arguing that the 
GILTI rules could be improved by adopting a “per-country minimum tax ra-
ther than one done on a global basis”).  
 311. As described supra notes 257–59 and accompanying text, however, 
these pressures may be exaggerated in all events.  
 312. In this case, the neutrality rule could address the international mar-
gin between domestic and foreign income while the relative corporate penalty 
could address the domestic margin between the corporate and pass-through 
systems. But see the possible obstacles to these reforms described supra note 
260. See also MIRRLEES ET AL., supra note 308, at 444 (describing the “practi-
cal difficulties” and potential violation of international agreements in prefer-
encing mobile forms of income).  
 313. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVID-
UAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 1–14 
(1992) (describing the distortions caused by the separate corporate tax and 
how they would be alleviated through corporate integration); ERIC TODER & 
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have multiple aims. First, U.S. individuals—because they are 
taxed on their worldwide income—cannot readily shift income 
across borders to try to avoid U.S. rates.314 As a result, these 
reforms could reduce the preference for foreign income. Second, 
these reforms would help align the tax rates and preferences 
across the corporate and pass-through systems, thus reducing 
opportunities for revenue-losing substitution within the domes-
tic income tax base.315  
This second set of neutrality rules involve much more dra-
matic changes to the business tax system and could treat in-
come more neutrally, both across borders and across business 
forms. This approach, however, may present other disad-
vantages. For instance, recent research has shown that a sig-
nificant share of corporate stock is held by non-taxable people 
or entities, such as retirement accounts, pension funds, and 
 
ALAN D. VIARD, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., A PROPOSAL TO REFORM 
THE TAXATION OF CORPORATE INCOME 17–18 (2016), https://www 
.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000817-a 
-proposal-to-reform-the-taxation-of-corporate-income.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
XT2P-LLV9] (proposing to tax interests in publicly-traded corporations at the 
individual level through “mark-to-market taxation” and interests in closely-
held corporations in the same manner as interests in pass-throughs); Michael 
J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and Individual In-
come Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAX NOTES 1767, 1770 (1999) (describing tax 
policy choices in integrating corporate and individual income tax schemes and 
discussing economic ramifications that would result); Harry Grubert & Ro-
sanne Altshuler, Shifting the Burden of Taxation from the Corporate to the 
Personal Level and Getting the Corporate Tax Down to 15 Percent, 69 NAT’L 
TAX J. 633, 658–62 (2016) (proposing to tax corporate income at a low 15% rate 
and then imposing an interest charge on deferred tax liabilities). To address 
the global pressures on tax revenues from tax competition, Professor Avi-
Yonah has also proposed a coordinated and uniform international withholding 
tax on portfolio investments. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Compe-
tition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 
1666–70 (2000).  
 314. See Grubert & Altshuler, supra note 313, at 665 (describing how shift-
ing the tax burden from the corporate to the individual sector would diminish 
the benefits from income shifting).  
 315. That is, the various corporate integration proposals may be under-
stood as proper applications of the “neutrality principle” in contrast to the mis-
taken goal of seeking average neutrality across entities in the 2017 tax legisla-
tion. See, e.g., DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 313, at 12 (“Integration 
would reduce and in some cases eliminate the distortions of business deci-
sions . . . by coordinating the individual and corporate income tax sys-
tems . . . .”).  
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foreigners.316 The corporate system offers the benefit of indi-
rectly taxing these otherwise tax exempt investors.317 Shifting 
the burden from the corporation to the owners through integra-
tion may also require reforming the taxation of these exempt 
taxpayers.318 
In the end, weighing these options—and particularly the 
choice between a relative corporate penalty and fundamental 
neutrality rule reforms—may also depend on the rate levels 
across the tax system as a whole. For example, assume Con-
gress implemented a top individual rate of approximately 70% 
in accordance with Representative Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal,319 
and then raised the corporate rate to within the range of 60–
70% to preserve a relative corporate penalty for most taxpay-
ers. These higher rates could have a much more significant ef-
fect on corporate investment across borders and may induce 
other tax avoidance behaviors not undertaken at current 
rates.320 In this scenario, the neutrality rule option—and, in 
particular, some form of corporate integration—may be more 
desirable, even if a shift to taxing individual shareholders ra-
ther than corporate income might entail additional challenges, 
such as the treatment of tax exempt investors. Alternatively, in 
a tax system with lower rate levels (though still higher than 
under the 2017 legislation), simply reverting to a relative cor-
porate tax penalty may be a more desirable method of breaking 
the ratchet. 
 
 316. See Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable 
Share of U.S. Corporate Stock, 151 TAX NOTES 923, 923 (2016) (estimating 
“that the share of U.S. corporate stock held in taxable accounts fell more than 
two-thirds over the last 50 years, from 83.6 percent in 1965 to 24.2 percent in 
2015”). 
 317. See SHAVIRO, supra note 22, at 155–56 (discussing the question of how 
tax-exempt shareholders should be treated under corporate integration).  
 318. Eric Toder and Alan Viard suggest, for example, imposing a 15% tax 
paid on interest to tax exempt institutions and retirement plans, “to limit 
the . . . benefit these taxpayers receive from a lower corporate tax rate.” 
TODER & VIARD, supra note 313, at 2.  
 319. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 320. MNCs still engage in significant profit shifting even with lower corpo-
rate rates, and therefore may not shift significantly more profits at even high-
er rates. See Clausing, supra note 129, at 29.  
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  CONCLUSION   
The progressivity ratchet begins with a basic insight from 
the tax policy literature. A preference for one portion of the tax 
base can undermine the effectiveness of tax increases on other 
portions of the base. Because of the preference, the tax increas-
es will raise less revenue at a higher efficiency cost. As a result, 
policymakers will be limited in their ability to progressively 
raise more revenue from the wealthiest taxpayers if they face 
one or more of certain political constraints in raising taxes on 
the wealthy: (1) a concern with the efficiency costs of taxation; 
(2) challenges to raising revenue through further increases to 
the top rates; or (3) a decision to tax the wealthy at the revenue 
maximizing rates.  
In turn, the neutrality principle suggests that policymak-
ers can mitigate the costs and revenue loss from taxation by 
treating close substitutes neutrally. This Article builds on these 
principles to evaluate the case of a new tax preference intro-
duced as a response to an initial preference and to explain why 
the legal rules defining the new preference will determine 
whether it mitigates or compounds the tax ratchet from the ini-
tial preference.  
This Article then applies this framework to reevaluate the 
new preferences for business income in the 2017 tax legislation 
and to explain why these changes will obstruct future progres-
sive income tax reforms. Many commentators criticized the de-
sign of the new “pass-through” deduction but praised or tacitly 
accepted the corporate rate cut as a response to international 
pressures. This Article’s framework offers an alternative un-
derstanding of these changes and explains why they both rep-
resent similar mistakes that will compound the progressivity 
ratchet and limit the revenue raising potential from future rate 
increases on taxpayers with the highest incomes.  
Understanding the 2017 tax legislation through the lens of 
the progressivity ratchet also suggests the possible paths for-
ward. This Article explains how policymakers can weigh differ-
ent options to correct the mistakes in the 2017 legislation and 
thereby enable future progressive income tax reforms.  
 
 
